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THE ILLINOIS CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND THE TASK AHEAD
Harry G. Fins*
In the field of procedural law, the Code of Civil Procedure is the most ad-
vanced development in Illinois history. The objective of this article is to show
what has been accomplished in this field between 1980 and 1985, and to point
out specifically what remains to be done in 1986 and beyond.
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I. ACCOMPLISHMENTS 1980-1985
The movement to enact the Code of Civil Procedure' (the Code) began with
the publication of an article by this author in January, 1980.2 In March, 1980,
a bipartisan coalition introduced the Code in the 81st General Assembly as
House Bill 3262.1 The sponsors of Bill 3262 did not hasten its passage in order
to allow the legislature, the judiciary, and the bar ample opportunity to ex-
amine carefully the bill and to offer suggestions.
The Code, as originally drafted, encompassed three categories of improve-
ments: 1) compositional rearrangement of sixty-two acts, 2) phraseological
alterations, and 3) desirable substantive changes. A number of legislators
completely approved all three categories, but insisted on executing the project
in two steps: first, the enactment of compositional rearrangement and phra-
seological alterations; second, after the enactment of the Code into law, the
proposal of amendments to various sections of the Code to achieve the re-
quired substantive changes. This process allowed legislators to consider closely
each substantive proposal.
To carry out this plan, House Bill 3262 was revised and introduced in the
82d General Assembly, on February 3, 1981, as House Bill 145. 4 On May 15,
1981, the Illinois House of Representatives passed House Bill 145 by unani-
mous vote. Similarly, in June, 1981, the Illinois Senate passed House Bill 145
by unanimous vote. The governor approved the bill on August 19, 1981, and
the Code thereby became Public Act No. 82-280. 5 The Code, however, did
not take effect until July 1, 1982. Since the Code was approved on August 19,
1981, but did not go into effect until July 1, 1982, the General Assembly had
ample opportunity to amend the Code before its effective date.
After the Code's enactment, a multitude of sections remained in the Illinois
statutes that referred to the various acts which were repealed by the Code.
These sections required amendment so as to refer to the appropriate Code
sections. The largest groups within this sphere contained references to the re-
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 1-101 to 19-128 (1983). Because the author has requested
that footnotes be kept to a minimum, references to this statute will be made throughout the
article without citation.
2. Fins, Code of Civil Procedure for Illinois, 68 ILL. B.J. 312 (1980).
3. H.B. 3262, 82d Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1980 Sess. Bill 3262 was sponsored by 4 democrats
and 4 republicans.
4. H.B. 145, 82d Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1981 Sess. (introduced on February 3, 1981).
5. Pub. Act. No. 82-280, Article I-XIX-c, 1981 I11. Laws 1382-1630 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, §§ 1-101 to 19-128 (1983)).
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pealed Civil Practice Act, 6 Administrative Review Act, 7 and Eminent Domain
Act." In 1982, the enactment of Public Act No. 82-783, Article XI accom-
plished these necessary changes. 9
A number of statutory references contained in the Illinois Supreme Court
Rules also required amendment for appropriate coordination with the Code.
Hence, the Illinois Supreme Court coordinated all of its rules with the Code,
effective July 1, 1982.
The Code was designed to accomplish four objectives: organization, unifi-
cation, coordination, and modernization. Both the legislature and the legal
profession were pleased with the results of the Code. To evidence their satis-
faction with the Code and express their appreciation of its draftsmanship, the
Illinois 82d General Assembly presented commendations to Harry G. Fins in
the form of House Resolution 700 and Senate Resolution 629. Furthermore,
on July 1, 1982, the day when the Code went into effect, the Illinois State Bar
Association awarded Harry G. Fins the Medal of Merit-the highest honor
theretofore bestowed by that professional organization.
The Code was derived from sixty-two preceding acts, which were drafted at
various periods in Illinois history by numerous individuals. Because each in-
dividual wrote differently, it was necessary to amend many Code sections to
achieve complete uniformity in terminology and style. A number of technical
errors also needed correction.
The keen interest which the Illinois legislature and the legal profession have
shown in the improvement of the Code is evident from the following statis-
tics:
1) In 1982, twenty-eight sections of the Code were amended, two new
sections were added, and one section was repealed.
2) In 1983, 231 sections of the Code were amended, fourteen new sec-
tions were added, and thirty-four sections were repealed.
3) In 1984, twenty-three sections of the Code were amended, and three
new sections were added.
II. THE ROAD AHEAD IN 1986 AND BEYOND
Numerous sections of the Code of Civil Procedure still require prompt at-
tention. This article discusses each section and the reasons attention is needed,
and proposes a bill to remedy the deficiency.
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 1-94 (1979).
7. Id., §§ 264-279.
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 47, §§ 1-17 (1979).
9. Pub. Act. No. 82-783, Article XI, 1982 Ill. Laws 220, 852 (codified throughout ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110 (1983)).
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A. Default Judgments
1. Section 2-210(c): Watercraft and Aircraft Long Arm Jurisdiction
Code section 2-210 governs specific long arm jurisdiction. This section is
derived from a prior act entitled "An Act in relation to actions against non-
resident owners and operators of aircrafts or watercraft."' 2 The prior act con-
sisted of three sections that were converted into one section, with each sub-
section lettered "a," "b," and "c," respectively. The legislature retained the
substance of the text and. added only one section heading. This section was
placed adjacent to the other sections which cover the subject of "long-arm"
jurisdiction because the text deals with that subject.
The general "long-arm" provisions are contained in Code sections 2-208
and 2-209 (former sections 16 and 17 of the Civil Practice Act). There are also
several specific "long arm" provisions that address foreign corporations, 3
antitrust violations, 4 insurers,'" non-resident executors, 16 persons who are
subject to Illinois taxation, 7 and the sale or delivery of securities in Illinois. 8
Code section 2-208(c) (former section 16(3) of the Civil Practice Act) pro-
vides that a default judgment entered on service outside Illinois may be set
aside only by a showing that would be timely and sufficient to set aside a
default judgment if personal service was had within Illinois.
None of the aforementioned specific "long arm" provisions address the
procedures that apply when the court enters a default judgment based upon
"long arm" service of process. This omission occurs because Code section 1-
108(b) (derived from section 1 of the Civil Practice Act) provides that article
II of the Code "applies to matters of procedure not regulated by such other
statutes."
By virtue of Code sections 2-1301(e) and 2-1401(c) (former sections 50(5)
and 72(3) of the Civil Practice Act) a default judgment may be set aside within
thirty days, and under unusual circumstances, within two years after a court
enters the order. Section 2-210(c), however, directly contravenes Sections 2-
1301(e) and 2-1401(c). Section 2-210(c) of the Code includes a "long arm"
provision involving aircraft and watercraft, which provides that a default
judgment may be set aside within either five years or one year, rather than the
two year or thirty day limitation of the other two sections. Section 2-210(c) is
therefore considered special legislation, which directly violates article IV, sec-
tion 13 of the Illinois Constitution. Article IV, section 13 provides that: "The
General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or
12. 1951 Ill. Laws 1619 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-210 (1983)).
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 5.25, 163a74 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-7.1 (1983).
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 689, 717, 724, 733-6 (1983).
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 6-13 (1983).
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 444i (1983).
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.10 (1983).
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can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable
shall be a matter for judicial determination." 9
In Bridgewater v. Hotz, 20.the Illinois Supreme Court stated that:
The principal change effected by section 13 is that it specifically rejects the
rule enunciated in a long line of decisions of this court that whether a gen-
eral law can be made applicable is for the legislature to determine Sommers
v. Patton (1948), 399 Ill. 540, Trustees v. The Commissioners of Lincoln
Park (1918), 282 Ill. 348) and specifically provides that "it shall be a matter
for judicial determination." 2'
The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently cited Bridgewater v. Hotz in Grace
v. Howlett 22 and People ex rel. East Side Levee and Sanitary District v. Mad-
ison County Levee and Sanitary District,23 to support its observation that the
deference previously accorded the legislative judgment, as to whether a gen-
eral law could be made applicable, has been largely eliminated by the addition
in section 13 of the provision that "[this) shall be a matter for judicial deter-
mination. 2 4 Section 2-210(c) should therefore be amended by replacing "one
year" with "30 days" and by replacing "5 years" with "2 years."
2. Section 2-1301(g)
By virtue of Code sections 2-1301(e) and 2-1401(c) (former sections 50(5)
and 72(3) of the Civil Practice Act) a default judgment may be set aside within
thirty days after its entry, and under unusual circumstances, within two years.
In direct contrast to these provisions is Code section 2-1301(g), which ad-
dresses default judgments when the defendant "has been served by publica-
tion." Section 2-1301(g) provides for setting aside a default judgment within
ninety days rather than thirty days and in unusual circumstances, within one
year rather than within two years. The provisions of section 2-1301(g) consti-
tute special legislation, which directly violates article IV, section 13 of the
Illinois Constitution.2'
In order to eliminate the inconsistency surrounding default judgments, the
following bill is herewith submitted:
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend sections 2-210 and 2-1301 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
approved August 19, 1981, as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly:
19. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
20. 51 Ill. 2d 103, 281 N.E.2d 317 (1972).
21. Id. at 110, 281 N.E.2d at 321.
22. 51 IM. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
23. 54 Ill. 2d 442, 298 N.E.2d 177 (1973).
24. Id. at 447, 298 N.E.2d at 179.
25. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Section 1. Sections 2-210 and 2-1301 of the Code of Civil Procedure, ap-
proved August 19, 1981, as amended, are amended to read as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 2-210)
Sec. 2-210. Aircraft and Watercraft. (a) For the purposes of this Section:
"aircraft" means any contrivance now known, or hereafter invented, used
or designed for flight in the air;
"watercraft" means any boat, vessel, craft or floating thing designed for
navigation in the water; and
"waters of this State" means the Illinois portion of all boundary lakes and
rivers, and all lakes, rivers, streams, ponds and canals within the State of
Illinois.
(b) The use and operation by any person of an aircraft on the land or in
the air over this State or the use and operation by any person of a watercraft
in the waters of this State, shall be deemed an appointment by such person of
the Secretary of State, to be his or her true and lawful attorney upon whom
may be served all legal process in any action or proceeding against him or her,
growing out of such use or resulting in damage or loss to person or property,
and such use or operation shall be signification of his or her agreement that
any such process against him or her which is so served, shall be of the same
legal force and validity as though served upon him or her personally if such
person is a nonresident of this State or at the time a cause of action arises is
a resident of this State but subsequently becomes a nonresident of this State.
Service of such process shall be made by serving a copy upon the Secretary of
State or by filing such copy in his or her office, together with a fee of $2.00,
and such service shall be sufficient service upon such person; if notice of such
service and a copy of the process are, within 10 days thereafter, sent by reg-
istered mail by the plaintiff to the defendant, at the last known address of the
defendant, and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance herewith is appended to
the summons. The court in which the action is pending may order such con-
tinuances as may be necessary to afford the defendant reasonable opportunity
to defend the action. The fee of $2.00 paid by the plaintiff to the Secretary of
State at the time of the service shall be taxed in his or her costs, if he or she
prevails in the action. The Secretary of State shall keep a record of all such
processes, which shall show the day and hour of such services.
(c) When a final judgment is entered against any non-resident defendant
who shall not have received notice of service and a copy of the process by
registered mail, required to be sent him or her as above provided, and such
person, his or her heirs, legatees devisees, executor, administrator or other
legal representatives, as the case may require, shall within 30 days one year
after the notice in writing given him or her of such judgment, or within 2 5
years after such judgment, if no such notice has been given, as above stated,
..... n -. ourt and petition the court to be heard touching the matter
of such judgment, and shall pay such costs as the court may deem reasonable
in that behalf, the person so petitioning the court may appear and answer the
plaintiff's allegations, and thereupon such proceeding shall be had as if the
defendant defen dants had appeared in due time season and no judgment had
19851
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been entered rendered. If it appears upon the hearing that such judgment ought
not to have been entered mFade against such defendant, the same may be set
aside, altered, or amended as shall appear just; otherwise, it shall be ordered
to stand confirmed against such defendant. The judgment shall after 2 5 years
from the entry making thereof, if not set aside in the manner stated above, be
deemed and adjudged confirmed against such defendant, and all persons
claiming under him or her by virtue of any act done subsequent to the com-
mencement of such action, and at the end of the 2 5 years, the court may
enter make such further orders eFder in the premises as shall be required to
carry the same into effect.
(ch. 110, par. 2-1301)
Sec. 2-1301. Judgments-Default-Confession. (a) The court shall deter-
mine the rights of the parties and grant to any party any affirmative relief
to which the party may be entitled on the pleadings and proofs. Judgment
shall be in the form required by the nature of the case and by the recovery
or relief awarded. More than one judgment may be entered Fendered in the
same cause. If relief is granted against a party who upon satisfying the same
in whole or in part will be entitled by operation of law to be reimbursed by
another party to the action, the court may determine the rights of the parties
as between themselves, and may thereafter upon motion and notice in the
cause, and upon a showing that satisfaction has been made, enter render a
final judgment against the other party accordingly.
(b) A determination in favor of the plaintiff on an issue as to the truth or
validity of any defense in abatement shall be that the defendant answer or
otherwise plead.
(c) Except as otherwise limited by this subsection (c), any person for a debt
bona fide due may confess judgment by himself or herself or attorney duly
authorized, without process. The application to confess judgment shall be
made in the county in which the note or obligation was executed or in the
county in which one or more of the defendants reside or in any county in
which is located any property, real or personal, owned by any one or more
of the defendants. A judgment entered by any court in any county other than
those herein specified has no force or validity, anything in the power to con-
fess to the contrary notwithstanding.
No power to confess judgment shall be required or given after September
24, 1979 in any instrument used in a consumer transaction; any power to
confess given in violation hereof is null and void and any judgment entered
by a court based on such power shall be unenforceable. "Consumer trans-
action" as used in this Section means a sale, lease, assignment, loan, or
other disposition of an item of goods, a consumer service, or an intangible
to an individual for purposes that are primarily personal, family, or house-
hold.
(d) Judgment by default may be entered for want of an appearance, or
for failure to plead, but the court may in either case, require proof of
the allegations of the pleadings upon which relief is sought.
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(e) The court may in its discretion, before final order or judgment, set
aside any default, and may on motion filed within 30 days after entry
thereof set aside any final order or judgment upon any terms and conditions
that shall be reasonable.
(f) The fact that any order or judgment is joint does not deprive the
court of power to set it aside as to fewer than all the parties, and if so
set aside it remains in full force and effect as to the other parties.
(g) If any final judgment is entered against any defendant who has been
served by publication with notice of the commencement of the action and
who has not been served with a copy of the complaint, or received the
notice required to be sent him or her by mail, or otherwise brought into
court, and such defendant or his or her heirs, legatees, or personal rep-
resentatives, as the case may require, shall within 30 90 days after notice
in writing given him or her of the judgment, or within 2 years 1-year
after the judgment, if no notice has been given, appear in open eourt and
petition to be heard touching the matter of the judgment, the court shall
upon notice being given to the parties to such action who appeared therein
and the purchaser at a sale made pursuant to the judgment, or their
attorneys, set the petition for hearing and may allow the parties and the
purchaser to answer the petition. If upon the hearing it appears that the
judgment ought not to have been entered made against the defendant, it
may be set aside, altered or amended as appears just; otherwise the petition
shall be dismissed at petitioner's costs. If, however, a sale has been had
under and pursuant to the final judgment, the court, in altering or amending
the judgment may, upon terms just and equitable to the defendant, permit
the sale to stand. If upon the hearing of the petition it appears that the
defendant was entitled under the law to redeem from the sale, the court
shall permit redemptiom to be made at any time within a reasonable time
90 days thereafter, upon terms that are equitable and just.
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
B. Section 2-411: Partnership
In 1941, the Illinois Supreme Court declared that "a partnership is not
a legal entity apart from the individual members ' 26 and "[tihe names of
its members must be set out in the complaint and summons. ' 27 In 1955,
the legislature added Section 27.1 to the Civil Practice Act to allow actions
against partnerships in their firm name. This modification alleviated the
need to list the names of each individual partner, who were often unknown
to the plaintiff. No modification was made, however, regarding actions by
partnerships as plaintiffs. Therefore, the earlier common law doctrine re-
mained that when a partnership sued as a plaintiff, the names of all of
26. Lewis v. West Side Trust and Sav. Bank, 377 Ill. 384, 385, 36 N.E.2d 573, 574 (1941).
27. Id. at 386, 36 N.E.2d at 575.
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its members-even if there are a hundred or more-must have been set
out in the complaint and summons. Because Code section 2-411 was derived
from section 27.1 of the Civil Practice Act without any change in the text,
there has been no procedural change in Illinois law.
The plaintiffs' inability to sue in a partnership name has caused great
inconvenience to both litigants and courts in cases involving firms with
many partners. For example, the accounting firm of Arthur Andersen &
Co. is a partnership consisting of over 1500 partners, and the law firm
of Baker & McKenzie is a partnership consisting of over 230 partners.
When multi-member partnerships sue as plaintiffs, the paper work involved
and the space consumed in listing all the names of the partners on the
complaint and summons is excessive. Section 2-411, subsection (a) is du-
plicative and tedious and does not benefit the defendant, the court, or the
public. Moreover, if during the pendency of the litigation a partner retires
or an employee is elevated to partnership, additional pleadings must be
filed under Code section 2-1008(a) (former section 54(1) of the Civil Practice
Act), which states:
(a) Change of interest or liability. If by reason of marriage, bankruptcy,
assignment, or any other event occurring after the commencement of a
cause or proceeding, either before or after judgment, causing a change
or transmission of interest or liability, or by reason of any person interested
coming into existence after commencement of the action, it becomes
necessary or desirable that any person not already a party be before the
court, or that any person already a party be made party in another
capacity, the action does not abate, but on motion an order may be
entered that the proper parties be substituted or added, and that the
cause or proceeding be carried on with the remaining parties and new
parties, with or without a change in the title of the cause.
If a partner in the plaintiff's firm dies or becomes legally disabled,
additional time-consuming legal action is also required under Code section
2-1008(b) and (c) (former section 54(2) and (3) of the Civil Practice Act).
Finally, if every partner is an indispensable party plaintiff, the inadvertent
ommission of a partner's name in the complaint or summons will result
in a void judgment, and this defect may be raised not only at the trial
court but also for the first time on appeal. 28 Therefore, subsection (a) and
the subject heading of Code section 2-411 should be amended.
To accomplish this objective, an appropriate bill is herewith submitted:
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend section 2-411 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved
August 19, 1981, as amended.
28. See Glickhauf v. Moss, 23 II1. App. 3d 679, 320 N.E.2d 132 (lst Dist. 1974) (citing and
discussing numerous other relevant cases).
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Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the
General Assembly:
Section 1. Section 2-411 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved August
19, 1981, as amended, is amended as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 2-411)
Sec. 2-411. Action by and against partnerships. (a) A partnership may
sue and be sued in the names of the partners as individuals doing business
as the partnership, or in the firn name, or both.
(b) An unsatisfied judgment against a partnership in its firm name does
not bar an action to enforce the individual liability of any partner.
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
C. Section 2-415: Sequestration
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307 provides:
(a) Order Appealable; Time. An appeal may be taken to the Appellate
Court from an interlocutory order of the court;
(2) appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver or sequestrator;
(3) giving or refusing to give other or further powers or property to a
receiver or sequestrator already appointed .... 2"
Sequestration is "[a] writ authorizing the taking into the custody of the
law of the real and personal estate (or rents, issues and profits) of a
defendant who is in contempt, and holding the same until he shall comply." 30
A sequestrator is "[o]ne appointed or chosen to perform a sequestration,
or execute a writ of sequestration." ' Thus, a sequestrator and a receiver
are very similar.
In In re Marriage of Hilkovitch,32 the court stated:
The fact that the trial judge mistakenly labelled Richard Hoffman receiver
of JNH Enterprises, Inc., instead of sequestrator does not change the
duties imposed upon him; whereas a receiver is appointed to hold and
manage property to preserve it from destruction during pending litigation
(Firebaugh v. McGovern (1949), 404 Il. 143, 88 N.E.2d 473), a sequestrator
is appointed to seize and sell the assets held by the noncomplying party.
(In re Marriage of Rochford (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 769, 414 N.E.2d
1096.) The fact that a sequestrator might have to manage property during
the period of time a buyer is being sought does not automatically transform
him into a receiver. Richard Hoffman's directions were to sell each of
Dennis' assets, thereby making the designation "sequestrator" the ap-
propriate one.3"
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, § 307 (1983).
30. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (5th ed. 1979).
31. Id. at 1226.
32. 124 Ill. App. 3d 401, 464 N.E.2d 795 (Ist Dist. 1984).
33. Id. at 424, 464 N.E.2d at 809-10.
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Code section 2-415 provides for the appointment of, and actions against,
receivers. No Illinois statute, however, deals with the appointment of or
actions against sequestrators in any manner. Therefore, Code section 2-
415 should be amended by adding the phrase "or sequestrator" after
"receiver" in every place where "receiver" appears in the section. Such
an amendment will fill this gap in Illinois procedural law.
It is noteworthy that in addressing the appointment of receivers, the
statute does not specify the circumstances which justify such court action.
This determination is aptly left to the judiciary. Similarly, in the appointment
of a sequestrator, the statute need not specify the circumstances which
justify such court action since the subject is amply covered by Illinois case
law.1
4
The following bill to eliminate the discrepancy between receivers and
sequestrators is herewith submitted:
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend section 2-415 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved
August 19, 1981, as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the
General Assembly:
Section 1. Section 2-415 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved August
19, 1981, as amended, is amended to read to as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 2-415)
Sec. 2-415. Appointment of and actions against receivers or sequestrators
(a) Before any receiver or sequestrator shall be appointed the party
making the application shall give bond to the adverse party in such penalty
as the court may order and with security to be approved by the court
conditioned to pay all damages including reasonable attorney's fees sustained
by reason of the appointment and acts of such receiver or sequestrator,
in case the appointment of such receiver or sequestrator is revoked or set
aside. Bond need not be required, when for good cause shown, and upon
notice and full hearing, the court is of the opinion that a receiver or
sequestrator ought to be appointed without such bond.
(b) On an application for the appointment of a receiver or sequestrator,
the court may, in lieu of appointing a receiver or sequestrator, permit the
34. See Manning v. Mercantile Securities Co., 242 Ill. 584, 90 N.E. 238 (1909); Wightman
v. Wightman, 45 111. 167 (1867); Hellwig v. Hellwig, 100 Ill. App. 3d 452, 426 N.E.2d 1087
(Ist Dist. 1981); In re Marriage of Laser, 91 I1l. App. 3d 769, 414 N.E.2d 1096 (Ist Dist. 1980);
Ryan v. Ryan, 56 111. App. 3d 483, 371 N.E.2d 1199 (Ist Dist. 1978); Factor v. Factor, 27 Ill.
App. 3d 594, 327 N.E.2d 396 (1st Dist. 1975); Victor v. Victor, 31 111. App. 2d 60, 333 N.E.2d
296 (ist Dist. 1961); Gray v. Gray, 6 Ill. App. 2d 571, 129 N.E.2d 706 (Ist Dist. 1955); Stewart
v. Stewart, I III. App. 2d 283, 117 N.E. 579 (4th Dist. 1954); Mowrey v. Mowrey, 328 I1.
App. 92, 65 N.E. 234 (Ist Dist. 1946); Williams v. Williams, 279 III. App. 274 (3d Dist. 1935);
Tuttle v. Gunderson, 254 I11. App. 552 (1st Dist. 1929); Schaeffer v. Potzel, 238 Ill. App. 335
(Ist Dist. 1925).
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party in possession to retain such possession upon giving bond with such
penalty and with such security and upon such condition as the court may
order and approve; and the court may remove a receiver or sequestrator
and restore the property to the possession of the party from whom it was
taken upon the giving of a like bond.
(c) Every receiver or sequestrator of any property appointed by any court
of this State may be sued in respect of any act or transaction of the
receiver or sequestrator in carrying on the business connected with the
property, without the previous leave of the court in which the receiver or
sequestrator was appointed; but the action shall be subject to the jurisdiction
of the court in which the receiver or sequestrator was appointed, so far
as the same is necessary to the ends of justice.
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
D. Sections 2-1001 and 2-1002: Change of Venue
Sections 2-1001 and 2-1002 of the Code were derived from the 1979
Illinois Revised Statutes, chapter 110, paragraphs 501 through 535.
1. Sections 2-1001 and 2-1002 Employ Incorrect Terminology
"AN ACT to revise the law in relation to change of venue" (former
paragraphs 501 through 536 of the Illinois Revised Statutes, 1979, chapter
110) uses incorrect terminology by employing the term "change of venue"
instead of the terms "substitution of a judge" and "change of place of
trial" where the judicial proceeding will commence. In the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1983 these two concepts are appropriately kept separate and
distinct. 5 The civil statutory provisions for covering the two procedures-
each of which is governed by separate and distinct standards-must be
corrected to clarify the procedural steps.
2. Section 2-1001(1) Contravenes Settled Case Law
Section 2-1001(l) states as follows: "(1) All questions concerning the
regularity of the proceedings in a change of venue, and the right of the
court to which the change is made to try the case and enforce the judgment,
shall be considered as waived after trial and verdict." In Board of Education
of Township High School District Number 201 v. Morton Council, West
Suburban Teachers Union Local 571,36 the Illinois Supreme Court reversed
a finding of the circuit court, which had denied a petition for a change
of venue. 31 Settled Illinois case law holds that if a trial court erroneously
35. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-5 (1983) (entitled "Substitution of judge") with
id. § 114-6 (entitled "Change of place of trial").
36. 50 Ill. 2d 258, 278 N.E.2d 769 (1972).
37. Id. at 261-262, 278 N.E.2d at 771.
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denies a change of venue and proceeds to trial and judgment, all proceedings
subsequent to the denial of the change of venue are void.3" In Howarth
v. Howarth,19 the court explained that participation at trial "by a party
whose application for a change of venue has been denied does not waive
error in denying application. 40
In Wheaton National Bank v. Aarvold,41 the court observed that in
Illinois, courts have repeatedly held that a court must grant a timely-filed
motion for change of venue in proper form which is based on the alleged
prejudice of the judge before whom the matter is pending. Orders entered
by that judge after the order denying the change of venue are void. As
a result, the legislature should eliminate Code section 2-1001(l).
A bill to clarify the distinction between "change of place of trial" and
"substitution of a judge" is herewith submitted:
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend sections 2-1001 and 2-1002 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, approved August 19, 1981, as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented by the
General Assembly:
Section 1. Sections 2-1001 and 2-1002 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
approved August 19, 1981, as amended, are amended to read as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 2-1001)
Sec. 2-1001. Substitution of judge. (a) Where the judge is a party, or
interested in the action, or the testimony of the judge is material to either
of the parties to the action, or the judge is related to, or has been related
to, or has been attorney for, any party in regard to the matter in controversy,
a substitution of judge may be granted with or without the application of
either party.
(b) Where any party or his or her attorney fears that the party will not
receive a fair trial or hearing by the judge before whom the action is
pending because the judge is prejudiced against the party or the party's
38. See In re Marriage of Sipich, 80 Ill. App. 3d 883, 400 N.E.2d 696 (Ist Dist. 1980); City
of Peoria v. Peoria Rental, Inc., 61 Ill. App. 3d 1, 377 N.E.2d 546 (3d Dist. 1978); Frede v.
McDaniels, 37 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 347 N.E.2d 259 (Ist Dist. 1976); Johnson v. Johnson, 34 Ill.
App. Jd 356, 340 N.E.2d 68 (1st Dist. 1975); Anderson v. The City of Wheaton, 25 111. App.
3d 100, 323 N.E.2d 129 (2d Dist. 1975); Rowlen v. Hermann, 129 Ill. App. 2d 45, 262 N.E.2d
739 (1st Dist. 1970); Gates v. Gates, 38 Ill. App. 2d 446, 187 N.E.2d 460 (2d Dist. 1963).
39. 47 I1. App. 2d 177, 197 N.E.2d 736 (2d Dist. 1964).
40. Id. at 182, 197 N.E.2d at 739.
41. 16 Ill. App. 3d 193, 305 N.E.2d 541 (2d Dist. 1973). Similarly, in In re Marriage of
Cummins, 106 Ill. App. 3d 44, 435 N.E.2d 506 (2d Dist. 1982), the court stated: "Any order
entered after an improper denial of a change of venue is void." Id. at 47, 435 N.E.2d at 508.
Finally, in People v. Samples, 107 Ill. App. 3d 523, 437 N.E.2d 1232 (5th Dist. 1982), the
court said that if a motion for the substitution of a judge "is improperly denied, all subsequent
action of the trial court is void." Id. at 527, 437 N.E.2d at 1235.
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attorney, a substitution of judge may be granted by consent of the parties
or upon petition presented to the judge before whom the cause is pending.
The petition shall state the cause for the application and shall be verified
by the affidavit of the applicant, reasonable notice of such application
having been given to the adverse party or his or her attorney. A petition
for substitution of a judge shall not be granted unless it is presented before
trial or hearing begins and before the judge to whom it is presented has
ruled on any substantial issue in the case. However, if any ground for
substitution of judge occurs thereafter, a petition for substitution of judge
may be presented based upon such ground.
(c) When any defendant in a proceeding for contempt arising from an
attack occurring otherwise than in open court, upon the character or conduct
of a judge, which proceeding is pending before the judge whose character
or conduct was impugned, fears that he or she will not receive a fair and
impartial trial before such judge, he or she may petition the court for a
substitution from such judge, such petition to be verified by the petitioner,
and thereupon such substitution of judge shall be granted.
(d) No party shall have more than one substitution of judge.
Change of venue. (a) A ehangc of vcnuc 'nan Ii ction may be had
in the Following situations.
(!) Whcrc the judge is a party of interested int the action, or his of her
testimny is mnaterial to either of the parties to the action, of he or sh-e
is related to, or has been counsci for any party in regard to the matter
in ctreversy. in any such situationt a ehangc of venue a c wrc
by the eeurt with or: without the application of either party.
(2) Whrc any party or his or her atter-ncy f eas that he er she will net
reeive a fair trial in the eouft in which the aeti n is pending, bccausc
the inhabitants of the county are of the judge is prejudiccd against himn
or hcr, or his or hcr! attorney, or the adverse party has ant undue influcncce
ever the minds of the inhabitants. in any such situation the venue shall
not be changcd cxccpt upon application, as provided herein, or by conscat
of the parties-.
(b) When a changc of Leu i ratd it may be to seine othefr judge
in the same county of in some othcr convenient county, to which there
isn alid ebjcction.
(e) Every application for a change of venue by a party of his or her
attoracy shall be by petition, setting Ffoth the cause of the application and
paig a changc of venue, which petition shall be Ycrificd by the affidavit
of the applicant. A petition Ffor a changc of venue shall not be grantcd
unless it is presented beforce trial or hcaring begins and before the judge
to whom it is presented has ruled on anty substantial issue in the ease, but
if any ground for such changc of venuce occurs thcrcaftcr, a petition f-or
changc of venue may be presented based upon such ground.
(d) if the causc for the changc is the prcjudicc of the inhabitants oe
the county or the undue influcncc of the ad-verse party ever their minds,
the petition shall set Ffoth the facts upon which the petitioner bases his
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or hcr belief, and must be supportcd by the affidavits of at least 2 ether
reputable persons rcsiding in the county. The adverse party may eentre-vrt
the petition by countcrf affidavits, and the court may grant or deny the
petition as shall appear to be according to the right of the eas.
(e) The applieation may be mnade to the court in whieh thc aci
pending, reagsnable notiee theref having been given to the adverse party
or his or her attorncey.
(0) The order for a ehangc of venue mnay be made subjeet to such equitable
terms and conditions as safety to the rights of the parties mnay seem to
requirc, and the court in its diserctien may preserib.
(g) The cxpcnses attending a .hang. of .nu shall be taxed by the clrk
of the court fromn which the casc is ccrtificd according to the fates established
by law Ffo like scrviccs and shall be paid by the pctitioncr and not allowed
as part of the costs in the action.
(h) The order shall be void unless the party obtaining a change of -venue
shall, within 15 days, or such sheIt timce as the court may prscribc, pay
to the clcrk the cxpcngcs attending the change.
(i) Where thc vcnue is .hangd without the applcation of either party,
the costs of such changc shall abide the event of the action.
6) in all eases of changc of .nu, the clcfk of the court from which
the changc is granted shall immediately p a fa  ull transcript of the
record and proc :dings in the ease, and of the ptitien, affidavits and
ordcr for the changc of venue, and transmit the same, togcthcr with all
the papers filed in the ease, to the proper court, but when the cuci
changcd on behalf of a part of the defendants in a condcmnation proceeding,
it shall not be ncccssary to transmit the original papcrs in the ease, and
it shall bc sufficicnt to transmit ..r.tificd .pi.s of so much thcrcof as
pertains to the ease so changcd. Such transcript and papers or copicma
be transmnittcd by mail, or in such othcr way as th court mnay dirct
(k) The clcrk of the court to which the changc of vc .is gatcd shall
file the transcript and papers transmitted and dockct the causc, and such
causc shall be procccdcd in and dctcrmnincd before and aftcr judgment, as
if it had originated in such court.
(1) All questions concerning the regularity of the procccdings in a changc
of venue, and the right of the court to which the changc is made to try
the causc and enforcc the judgment, shall be considcrcd as waivcd after
trial and vrdict-.
(fn) When any defendant in a procccding Ffo contcmpt arising fromn an
attack occurring otherwise than in open court, upon the haratt.r or conduct
of a judge, which procccding is pending bcforc the judge whosc charactcr
or conduct was imnpugncd, fears that he or she will not r.. ci.v. a fair and
im.partial trial bf-of such judge, he or sh m ^ay petition the our fora
changc of venuc from such judge, such petition to be vcrificd by affida-vit
of the defendant, and thereupon such changc shall be grantcd.
(n) The clcrk of the coutrt to which the venue is changcd shall file thce
transcript and papcrs transmitted and dockct the ease, and such ease shall
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b. pr...d.d in and determined bcforc and after judgment, as if it had
originatcd in such court.
(e) Upon the entry of judgmecnt of any eivil cause int which the venue
has been ehanged, it shall be lawful for the party in whose fav2r judgment
is ecnterd, to file in the officc of the llark of the eourt where the ation
Snstitutced a tansript of such judgment, and the i ltrk shall filc th
saeuc ef dard, and enforemtnt may be had thereon, and the sae shall,
fromn the time if fing sueh transeript, have the san opration and cffet
as if originally regovcred in such court.
(ch. 110, par. 2-1002)
Sec. 2-1002. Change of place of trial. (a) Where any party or his or
her attorney fears that the party will not receive a fair trial in the court
in which the action is pending because the inhabitants of the county are
prejudiced against the party or the party's attorney or the adverse party
has an undue influence over the minds o the inhabitants, a change of
place of trial may be granted upon the consent of the parties or upon
petition to the court where the action is pending, reasonable notice thereof
having been given to the adverse party or his or her attorney. The petition
shall state the facts upon which the petitioner founds his or her belief,
and must be supported by the affidavits of at least 2 other reputable
persons resident of the county. The adverse party may controvert the
petition, and the court may grant or deny the petition as shall appear to
be according to the right of the case.
(b) No party shall have more than one change of place of trial.
(c) When a change of place of trial is granted, it may be to some other
convenient county, to which there is no valid objection.
(d) The order for change of place of trial may be made subject to terms
and conditions as safety to the rights of the parties may require and the
court in its discretion may prescribe.
(e) The expenses attending a change of place of trial shall be taxed by
the clerk of the court from which the case is certified according to the
rates established by the law for like services and shall not be charged as
part of the costs in the action.
(f) The order shall be void unless the party obtaining a change of place
of trial shall, within 15 days, or such shorter time as the court may
prescribe, pay to the clerk the expenses attending the change.
(g) In all cases of change of place of trial, the clerk of the court from
which the change is granted shall immediately prepare a full transcript of
the record and proceedings in the case, and of the petition, affidavits and
order for change of place of trial, and transmit the same, together with
all the papers filed in the case to the clerk of the proper court. However,
when a change of place of trial is granted on behalf of a part of the
defendants, in a condemnation proceeding, it shall not be necessary to
transmit certified copies of so much thereof as does not pertain to the
case so changed. Such transcript and papers and copies may be transmitted
by mail or in such other manner as the court may direct.
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(h) The clerk of the court to which the place of trial is changed shall
file the transcript and papers transmitted to him or her and shall docket
the case, and the case shall be proceeded in and determined in all respects,
before and after judgment, as if it has originated in such court.
(i) Upon the entry of judgment in any case in which the place of trial
was changed, the party in whose favor judgment was entered may file, in
the office of the clerk of the court wherein the action had originally been
instituted, a transcript of such judgment, and the clerk shall enter the same
in the judgment docket, and enforcement thereof may be had, and the
judgment shall, from the time of filing such transcript, have the same
operation and effect as if originally recovered in such court.
Limitation of ehange of venue. No party shall have more than one ehange
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
E. Evidentiary Issues
1. Section 2-1103: Affidavits
Section 2-1103 is derived from section 69 of the Civil Practice Act, which
consisted of two subsections. The two subsections were copied from sections
85 and 86 of the Practice Act of 1907.42
The modern practice concerning affidavits is to present the affidavit to
the court in a pleading, not to read the affidavit to the court. This practice
inspired a change in the language of subsection (a).
The last sentence in subsection (b) states that the section "does not apply
to applications for change of venue on grounds of prejudice." "Change
of venue on grounds of prejudice," applies in two separate and distinct
situations: the prejudice of a judge, and the prejudice of county inhabitants.
A judge to whom a party applies for a change of venue on the ground
of judicial prejudice may not hear any further evidence. However, after
an application for change of venue because of local prejudice, the court
may hear evidence and permit the adverse party to controvert the petition
by counter-affidavits .4 3 These situations are separate and distinct because
the judge may hear evidence to determine whether the county inhabitants
have been prejudiced. A judge may not, however, determine his own
prejudice. Thus, the foregoing venue passage misstates the statutory rule.
The legislature should therefore substitute the phrase "change of venue"
with "the substitution of judges."
2. Section 2-1112: Oral Testimony
Section 2-1112 of the Code was originally section 38 of the Evidence
Act of 1872. 44 The text remains the same. Specific modifications to Code
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 85, 86 (1907).
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-1001(d) (1983) (former ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 504
(1979)).
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 1-48 (1872).
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section 2-1112 are currently required to correct two inaccuracies. Section
38 of the Evidence Act of 1872 provided: "On the trial of every action
seeking equitable relief, oral testimony shall be taken when desired by either
party." 45 This section conflicts with subsequent sections 48 and 57 of the
Civil Practice Act (Code sections 2-619 and 2-1005) and Supreme Court
Rule 191, which permit trial by affidavits without oral testimony. Moreover,
when a Supreme Court Rule and a statutory provision conflict, the Rule
predominates. 6 Therefore, section 2-1112 should be amended by inserting
"except as otherwise provided by law" at the end of the section. This
would remove the current conflict.
Additionally, the word "either" should be replaced with "any" since a
third-party defendant or intervenor may also request a trial by affidavits
or oral testimony.
In order to clarify the procedural aspects regarding affidavits, the following
bill is herewith submitted:
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend sections 2-1103 and 2-1112 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, approved August 19, 1981, as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois represented in the
General Assembly:
Section 1. Sections 2-1103 and 2-1112 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
approved August 19, 1981, as amended, are amended to read as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 2-1103)
Sec. 2-1103. Affidavits. (a) All affidavits presented to the court shall be
filed with the clerk.
(b) If evidence is necessary concerning any fact which according to law
and the practice of the court may now be supplied by affidavit, the court
may, in its discretion, require the evidence to be presented, wholly or in
part, by oral examination of the witnesses in open court upon notice to
all parties not in default, or their attorneys. If the evidence is presented
by oral examination, an adverse party shall have the right to cross-ex-
amination. This Section does not apply to applications for the substitution
of judges changc of vcnuc on grounds of prejudice.
Sec. 2-1112. -Oral testimony in actions seeking equitable relief. On the
trial of every action seeking equitable relief; oral testimony shall be taken
when desired by any either party, except as otherwise provided by law.
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
45. Id. § 38.
46. People v. Cox, 82 I11. 2d 268, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980); People v. Jackson, 69 Ill. 2d
252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977).
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F. Transfer of Existing Acts Into
the Code of Civil Procedure
The Code of Civil Procedure became effective on July 1, 1982. Subsequent
research indicated that five sections of chapter 110 of the 1979 Illinois
Revised Statutes, paragraphs 801 through 805, should be incorporated into
the Code. This was accomplished in 1983 when the legislature passed Public
Act 83-350, whereby section 2-621 (incorporating former paragraphs 801
through 805) was added to the Code without any change in the law. 47
Similarly, subsequent research indicates that certain Illinois Acts delineated
in the following proposed bills, which are now outside the Code, should
be transferred into the Code, without any substantive change in their
respective areas of Illinois law.
Bills to accomplish these objectives are herewith submitted:
Proposed Bills
An Act relating to trust estates.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the
General Assembly:
Section 1. Section 2-1404 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure,
approved August 19, 1981, as amended, the added section to read as
follows:
(ch. 110, new par. 2-1404)
Sec. 2-1404. Preservation of trust estates. In all cases where a trustee
has been or shall be appointed by order of a court having authority to
authorize the payment of interest on any mortgage which is a lien upon
the trust estate, to authorize the payment of taxes and assessments levied
upon or assessed against the trust estate, to authorize the payment of
insurance premium on any policy of insurance on the buildings and personal
property of the trust estate, and to authorize the making of repairs and
the payment therefore, when it appears for the best interest of the estate;
and where a trustee has paid any such interest, taxes, assessments, insurance
premiums, or for repairs, and it appears that such payments were for the
best interests of the estate and the protection and preservation thereof, the
court, on application or by report, has authority to approve such payments.
(ch. 110, rep. pars. 403 and 404).
Section 2. "An Act in relation to trust estates," approved July 1, 1931,
as amended, is repealed.
Section 3. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
The above Act became law by Pub. Act No. 84-621, effective Sept. 20,
1985.
An Act amending the Code of Civil Procedure, approved August 19,
1981, as amended, and repealing certain other Acts.
47. 1983 Il1. Laws 2810, (consisting of five lettered subdivisions, codified as amended at
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-621 (1983)).
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Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois represented in the
General Assembly:
Section 1. Parts 17 and 18 are added to Article II of the Code of Civil
Procedure, approved August 19, 1981, as amended, the added Parts to
read as follows:
Part 17. Lis Pendens
(ch. 110, new par. 2-1701)
Sec. 2-1701. Lis Pendens-Operative date of notice. Every condemnation
proceeding, proceeding to sell real estate of decedent to pay debts, or other
action seeking equitable relief, affecting or involving real property shall,
from the time of filing in the office of the recorder in the county where
the real estate is located, a notice signed by any party to the action or
his or her attorney of record or attorney in fact, on his or her behalf,
setting forth the title of the action, the parties to it, the court where it
was brought and a description of the real estate, be constructive notice to
every person subsequently acquiring an interest in or a lien on the property
affected thereby, and every such person and every person acquiring an
interest or lien as above stated, not in possession of the property and
whose interest or lien is not shown of record at the time of filing such
notice, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed a subsequent
purchaser and shall be bound by the proceedings to the same extent and
in the same manner as if he or she were a party thereto. If in any such
action plaintiff or petitioner neglects or fails for the period of 6 months
after the filing of the complaint or petition to cause notice to be given
the defendant or defendants, either by service of summons or publication
as required by law, then such notice shall cease to be such constructive
notice until service or summons or publication as required by law is had.
This section authorizes a notice of any of these actions concerning real
property pending in any United States district court to be recorded and
indexed in the same manner and in the same place as herein provided with
respect to notices of such actions pending in courts'of this State.
However, no such action or proceeding shall be constructive notice, either
before or after service of summons or publication, as to property subject
to the provisions of "An Act concerning land titles," approved May 1,
1897, as amended, until compliance with the provisions of Section 84 of
that Act has been effected.
At any time during the pendency of an action or proceeding initiated
after July 1, 1959, which is constructive notice, the court, upon motion,
may for good cause shown, provided a finding of specific performance is
not necessary for final judgment in the action or proceeding, and upon
such terms and conditions, including the posting of suitable bond, if any,
as it may deem equitable, authorize the making of a deed, mortgage, lease
or other conveyance of any or all of the real estate affected or involved,
in which event the party to whom the deed, mortgage, lease or other
conveyance of the real estate is made and those claiming under him or
her shall not be bound by such action or proceeding.
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(ch. 110, new par. 2-1702)
Sec. 2-1702. Lis Pendens-Bankruptcy. A certified copy of a petition,
with schedules omitted, commencing a proceeding under the Bankruptcy
Act of the United States or the order of adjudication in such proceeding,
or of the order approving the bond of the trustee appointed in the pro-
ceedings, may be filed, indexed and recorded in the office of the recorder
where conveyances of real estate are recorded in the same manner as deeds.
It shall be the duty of the recorder to file, index under the name of the
bankrupt, and record such certified copies filed for record in the same
manner as deeds, for which services the recorder shall be entitled to the
same fees as are provided by law for filing, indexing and recording deeds.
(ch. 110, new par. 2-1703)
Sec. 2-1703. Lis Pendens-Limitation as to Public Officers. In the absence
of a permanent or preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order
of a court, the bringing or pendency of any action alone, heretofore, or
hereafter brought, to defeat or enjoin the disbursement by public officers
of public funds to the persons, uses, or purposes for which they are
appropriated or set apart, including the payment of the salaries and wages
of all officers and employees of the State, or of any county, city, village,
town, or other municipality of the State, shall in no way change the liability
of any public officer in the disbursement of public funds on account of
any notice of matters contained in the pleadings in any action, but such
liability shall remain the same, insofar as the bringing or pendency of such
action alone is concerned, as if no such action had been brought.
Part 18. Mittimus
(ch. 110, new par. 2-1801)
Sec. 2-1801. Mittimus. (a) In all cases, including criminal, quasi-criminal,
and civil, when a person is imprisoned, incarcerated, confined, or committed
to the custody of a sheriff, warden, Department of Corrections, or other
executive officer by virtue of a judgment or order which is signed by a
judge, a copy of suh judgment or order shall, in each case, constitute
the mittimus, and no separate mittimus need be issued.
(b) Where no written judgment or order was signed by a judge, the
practice heretofore prevailing in such cases in the courts of this State shall
be followed.
Section 2. The following Acts are repealed:
(ch. 102, rep. par. 18)
"An Act to prevent the mere bringing or pendency of any suit from
changing the liability of public officers in the disbursement of the public
funds on account of notice of any matter contained in the pleadings."
Filed June 29, 1917.
(ch. 110, rep. pars. 405 and 406)
"An Act concerning constructive notice of condemnation proceedings,
proceedings to sell real property of decedents to pay debts, or other suits
seeking equitable relief involving real property, and proceedings in bank-
ruptcy," approved June 11, 1917, as amended.
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(ch. 110, rep. par. 701)
"AN ACT in relation to mittimus." Approved Aug. 28, 1979.
Section 3. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
The above Act became law by Pub. Act No. 84-622 effective Sept. 20,
1985.
G. Section 3-103: Review of Final Administrative Decisions
Code section 2-201 (derived from section 13 of the Civil Practice Act)
provides that an action "shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint.
The clerk shall issue summons upon the request of the plaintiff." Code
section 3-103 (derived from section 4 of the former Administrative Review
Act)4 directly contradicts section 2-201, and provides that "[elvery action
to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing
of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days from the date
that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the
party affected thereby." Thus, under section 2-201 only the filing of the
complaint is required-the initiation of which is within the plaintiff's power.
Under section 3-103, however, the plaintiff must complete two steps: the
filing of the complaint, and the issuance of the summons. The issuance
of summons can only be perfomed by the clerk of the circuit court, an
officer of the judicial branch of state government 9 over whom the plaintiff
has no control.
In Cox v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners,5"' a decision later
reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court,5 the plaintiff filed a complaint
for administrative review on the thirty-fifth day after the service of the
administrative decision. The circuit court clerk did not issue the summons
until the following day. The trial court considered this delay to be fatal,
and dismissed the action. The Appellate Court for the Fourth District
affirmed the decision with one judge dissenting. Thus, the plaintiff lost
because of the circuit clerk's general incompetence. This result is grossly
unfair to the plaintiff and totally unnecessary, as is evident from the fact
that in other civil cases an action is "commenced by the filing of a
complaint," as provided in Code section 2-201. The issuance of the summons
is a clerical duty of the circuit court clerk and should be left to the clerk's
office management.
In City National Bank and Trust Co. v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal
Board,52 the complaint for administrative review was filed on a Friday,
the thirty-fifth day from the service of the administrative decision. The
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264-279 (1979).
49. See Drury v. County of McLean, 89 I11. 2d 417, 433 N.E.-2d 666 (1982).
50. 107 I11. App. 3d 704, 437 N.E.2d 1277 (4th Dist. 1982).
51. 96 I11. 2d 399, 451 N.E.2d 842 (1983).
52. 108 III. App. 3d 979, 439 N.E.2d 1301 (2d Dist. 1982).
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plaintiff's attorney notified the deputy clerk that this was the last day to
issue the summons. The deputy clerk advised the plaintiff's attorney that
it was the clerk's standard procedure to issue summons effective on the
date on which the complaint was filed. Nevertheless, when issued, the
summons bore the date of the following Monday, which was beyond the
thirty-fifth day required by the statute. The circuit court dismissed the
administrative review action. The Appellate Court for the Second District,
however, reversed. The court concluded that:
Here, the plaintiff-owner, in good faith, sought issuance of summons in
accordance with the mandatory provisions of the statute and advised the
clerk of the time limitation. While, as defendant suggests, the Owner's
[plaintiff's] counsel could have prepared the summons himself, that would
not have assured that the clerk would vary the practice and necessarily
have issued it on the day the complaint was filed, the 35th day."-
Therefore Code section 3-103 should be amended by deleting from the
first sentence the phrase "and the issuance of summons," and inserting,
at the beginning of the second paragraph, "The clerk shall issue summons
upon request of the plaintiff." This sentence also appears in Code section
2-201.
The following bill to eliminate the requirement that a party to a review
of an administrative decision issue a summons is herewith submitted:
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend section 3-103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved
August 19, 1981, as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the
General Assembly:
Section 1. Section 3-103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved August
19, 1981, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 3-103)
Sec. 3-103. Commencement of action. Every action to review a final
administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint
and the issuane of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy
of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected
thereby. The method of service or the decision shall be as provided in the
Act governing the procedure before the adminstrative agency, but if no
method is provided, a decision shall be deemed to have been served either
when personally delivered or when deposited in the United States mail, in
a sealed envelope or package, with postage prepaid, addressed to the party
affected thereby at his or her last known residence or place of business.
The clerk shall issue summons upon request of the plaintiff. The form
of the summons and the issuance of alias summons shall be according to
rules of the Supreme Court.
53. Id. at 983, 439 N.E.2d at 1305.
[Vol. 34:859
ILLINOIS CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
H. Section 3-111(a): Scope of the Administrative Review Act
In Basketfield v. Daniel,' 4 the appellate court noted that:
the scope of our review does not allow us to grant all the relief appellant
requests in his notice of appeal. The Administrative Review Act (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1977, ch. 110, pars. 264-79) provides that the scope of review shall
extend to all questions of law and fact presented by the entire record
... The court has the power to affirm or reverse the decision of the
administrative agency in whole or in part or to remand the cause for
additional evidence. There is no provision in the Act for the joinder of
a mandamus action for the restoration of the position formerly held or
an action for back wages. (See Drezner v. Civil Service Com. (1947),
398 Il. 219, 75 N.E.2d 303; Sgro v. City of Springfield (1972), 6 Il.
App. 3d 478, 285 N.E.2d 589. See also Davern v. Civil Service Com.
(1970), 47 I1. 2d 469, 269 N.E.2d 713, cert. denied, (1971), 403 U.S.
918, 29L. Ed. 2d 695, 91S. Ct. 2229.) Therefore, this court lacks ju-
risdiction to compel reinstatement or back pay."
Similarly, in Dorner v. Civil Service Commission, 6 the appellate court
followed Basketfield v. Daniel and explained that the trial court was limited
to a determination of whether the decision of the Civil Service Commission
was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court lacked jurisdiction
to order the Department of Corrections to offer the plaintiff the next
available CAT position. Likewise, it lacked jurisdiction to compel rein-
statement or back pay.' 7
The court's approach to procedural law resembles the days when common
law forms of action reigned supreme. A litigant who desired to set aside
a fraudulent decree more than thirty days after its entry had to file a new
action known as a bill of review. A litigant who wanted to enforce a
judgment against a judgment debtor who had concealed assets had to file
a new action known as a creditor's bill. A judgment creditor whose judgment
remained unpaid for more than seven years had to file a new action, then
known as scire facias, to revive a judgment. Fortunately, these archaic and
ritualistic procedures no longer exist in Illinois.'
Public employees who have lost their employment due to dubious ac-
cusations by their employers, but who have been exonerated in court have
suffered enough. It is unnecessary to frustrate them further by requiring
them to file a new action labeled "mandamus", or to compel them to
pay the circuit court clerk and the sheriff new fees for filing and for the
service of a new summons.
54. 71 Ill. App. 3d 877, 390 N.E.2d 492 (Ist Dist 1979).
55. Id. at 880, 390 N.E.2d at 494.
56. 85 III. App. 3d 957, 407 N.E.2d 750 (Ist Dist. 1980).
57. Id. at 963, 407 N.E.2d at 755.
58. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 55, 72, 73 (1981).
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This judicial circuity and impracticality is clearly inconsistent with the
decisions of Mills Prairie Community High School v. Miller5 9 and Good-
friend v. Board of Appeals of Cook County, 6 which stated that common
law certiorari may be joined with an injunction to obtain adequate relief.
Since 1967, there has been no difference between common law certiorari
and a proceeding under the Administrative Review Act. 6'
The availability of relief by partition in an action for dissolution of
marriage presents a parallel situation. 62 In Hitchcock v. Hitchcock,63 the
Illinois Supreme Court entertained a suit for divorce and a suit for partition
of jointly owned property. Both complaints arose out of the same difficulties.
The same parties were involved and had asserted various causes in the
complaint which could be more conveniently tried in one suit, thereby
avoiding multiplicity. The court reasoned that the appellant suffered no
unreasonable hardship and it was not error to join the complaint for
partition and the complaint for the divorce64
It is especially interesting to observe that the removal or dismissal of
teachers under section 24-12 of the School Code" is governed by the
Administrative Review Act. Section 24-12 of the School Code provides in
part:
If a decision of the hearing officer is adjudicated upon review or appeal
in favor of the teacher, then the trial court shall order reinstatement
and shall determine the amount for which the board is liable including
but not limited to loss of income and costs incurred therein.
Any teacher who is reinstated by any hearing or adjudication brought
under this Section shall be assigned by the Board to a position substantially
similar to the one which that teacher held prior to that teacher's suspension
or dismissal.66
A number of courts have ordered reinstatements and back pay on ad-
ministrative review under the above provision.6 1 Obviously, reinstatement
and the recovery of back pay can be adjudicated in an administrative review
59. 15 I11. App. 3d 87, 303 N.E.2d 603 (5th Dist. 1973).
60. 18 III. App. 3d 412, 305 N.E.2d 404 (Ist Dist. 1973).
61. See, e.g., Smith v. Department of Public Aid, 67 I1. 2d 529, 367 N.E.2d 1286 (1977);
Batley v. Kendall City Sheriff's Dept., Etc., 99 Ill. App. 3d 622, 425 N.E.2d 1201 (2d Dist.
1981); Maas v. Board of Trustees, 94 III. App. 3d 562, 418 N.E.2d 29 (5th Dist. 1981); Penrod
v. Department of Corrections, 72 Ill. App. 3d 649, 391 N.E.2d 59 (1st Dist. 1979); S & F
Corp. v. Bilandic, 62 III. App. 3d 193, 378 N.E.2d 1137 (1st Dist. 1978).
62. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 514 (1983).
63. 373 I11. 352, 26 N.E.2d 108 (1940).
64. Id. at 355-56, 26 N.E.2d at 109.
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 1-1 to 36-1 (1983). 6
66. Id. § 24-12.
67. See, e.g., Bessler v. Board of Education, 69 II1. 2d 191, 370 N.E.2d 1050 (1977); Board
ofEducation v. Metskas, 106 Ill. App. 3d 943, 436 N.E.2d 587 (Ist Dist. 1982); Miller v.
Board cf Education, 98 111. App. 2d 305, 240 N.E.2d 471 (Ist Dist. 1968).
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proceeding without the delay and expense of commencing new and successive
proceedings.
A bill to accomplish this objective is herewith submitted;
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend Section 3-111 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved
August 19, 1981, as amended.
Be it enacted by the people of the State of Illinois, represented in the
General Assembly:
Section 1. Section 3-111 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved August
19, 1981, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 3-111)
Sec. 3-111. Powers of circuit court. (a) The Circuit Court has power:
(1) with or without requiring bond (except if otherwise provided in the
particular statute under authority of which the administrative decision was
entered), and before or after answer filed, upon notice to the agency and
good cause shown, to stay the decision of the administrative agency, in
whole or in part pending the final disposition of the case;
(2) to make any order that it deems proper for the amendment, com-
pletion or filing of the record of proceedings of the administrative agency;
(3) to allow substitution of parties by reason of marriage, death, bank-
ruptcy, assignment or other cause;
(4) to dismiss parties or to realign parties plaintiffs and defendants;
(5) to affirm or reverse the decision in whole or in part;
(6) where a hearing has been held by the agency, to reverse and remand
the decision in whole or in part, and in such case, to state the questions
requiring further hearing or proceedings and to give such other instructions
as may be proper;
(7) where a hearing has been held by the agency, to remand for the
purpose of taking additional evidence when from the state of the record
of the administrative agency or otherwise it shall appear that such action
is just. However, no remandment shall be made on the ground of newly
discovered evidence unless it appears to the satisfaction of the court that
such evidence has in fact been discovered subsequent to the termination
of the proceedings before the administrative agency and that it could not
by the exercise of reasonable diligence have been obtained at such proceedings
and that such evidence is material to the issues and is not cumulative;
(8) in case of affirmance or partial affirmance of an administrative
decision which requires the payment of money, to enter judgment for the
amount justified by the record and for costs, which judgment may be
enforced as other judgments for the recovery of money;
(9) the plaintiff may, without filing a separate action for mandamus,
or any other separate action, join in the complaint for administrative review,
a separate count praying for reinstatement to a position of employment
or for the recovery of back pay or other relief which was theretofore
1985]
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available by an action for mandamus or by any other separate action;
(10) (9) when the particular statute under authority of which the ad-
ministrative decision was entered requires the plaintiff to file a satisfactory
bond and provides for the dismissal of the action for the plaintiff's failure
to comply with this requirement unless the court is authorized by the
particular statute to enter, and does enter, an order imposing a lien upon
the plaintiff's property, to take such proofs and enter such orders as may
be appropriate to carry out the provisions of the particular statute. However,
the court shall not approve the bond, nor enter an order for the lien, in
any amount which is less than that prescribed by the particular statute
under authority of which the administrative decision was entered if the
statute provides what the minimum amount of the bond or lien shall be
or provides how said minimum amount shall be determined. No such bond
shall be approved by the court without notice to, and an opportunity to
be heard thereon by, the administrative agency affected. The lien, created
by the entry of a court order in lieu of a bond, shall not apply to property
exempted from the lien by the particular statute under authority of which
the administrative decision was entered. The lien shall not be effective
against real property whose title is registered under the provisions of "An
Act concerning land titles," approved May 1, 1897, as amended, until the
provisions of Section 85 of that Act are complied with.
(b) Technicals errors in the proceedings before the administrative agency
or its failure to observe the technical rules of evidence shall not constitute
grounds for the reversal of the administrative decision unless it appears to
the court that such error or failure materially affected the rights of any
party and resulted in substantial injustice to him or her.
(c) On motion of either party, the circuit court shall make findings of
fact or state the propositions of law upon which its judgment is based.
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
L Article IV of the Code: Attachment
1. Part I of Article IV
Code section 2-602 (former section 32 of the Civil Practice Act) provides:
"The first pleading by the plaintiff shall be designated a complaint." Similar
provisions, requiring the commencement of an action by the filing of a
complaint, also appear in the following sections of the Code:
Section 3-103: Administrative Review.
Section 4-204: Attachment of Watercraft.
Section 6-108: Ejectment.
Section 7-101: Eminent Domain.
Section 9-106: Forcible Entry and Detainer.
Section 10-103: Habeas Corpus.
Section 11-101: Injunction.
Section 14-102: Mandamus.
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Section 15-108: Mortgage Foreclosure.
Section 17-101: Partition.
Section 18-103: Quo Warranto.
Section 19-104: Replevin.
Five of these Code sections require the commencement of an action by
the filing of a "verified complaint":
Section 4-204: Attachment of Watercraft.
Section 10-103: Habeas Corpus.
Section 11-101: Injunction.
Section 17-101: Partition.
Section 19-104: Replevin.
Part 1 of article IV of the Code, which addresses actions for attachment,
is in contrast to all of the above provisions. Hence, Part 1 presents a
solitary, anomalous, and wasteful procedure by splitting the filing of a
verified complaint into two legal steps:
(1) the filing of an affidavit (section 4-104 of the Code), and
(2) the filing of a complaint at a later period in the proceeding (section
4-130 of the Code).
This circuitous method not only duplicates paper work and court filing,
but also unnecessarily wastes time and energy, and contradicts the spirit,
if not the mandate, of article IV, section 13 of the Illinois Constitution. 6
The Circuit Court of Cook County has found the attachment statute to
be clumsy, unworkable, and anomalous. To solve this dilemma, the Circuit
Court has for several decades provided plaintiffs in attachment actions with
a printed form that combines the complaint and affidavit into a single
document. The plaintiff files this form as the first document in the case
to commence the attachment action. In effect, the court simply disregards
the specified procedure in the attachment statute. This undesirable situation
requires immediate attention. The legislature must act promptly to coordinate
the statute with actual practice in the field. 69
68. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
69. A knowledge of the following historical background is necessary to understand how the
currently anomalous attachment statute developed. Prior to January 1, 1934, filing a bill of
"complaint" in the chancery commenced a suit in equity. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 22, § 4 (1931).
On the other hand, the issuance of a summons commenced the legal action. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110, § 1 (1931). Thereafter, the declaration had to be filed ten days before the return day
of the summons. Id. § 32. Section 5 of the Civil Practice Act, which went into effect on
January 1, 1934, provided that civil actions, both at law and in equity, "shall be commenced
by the issuance of a summons," ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 133 (1935), thus unifying the legal
and equitable actions. In 1955 the Civil Practice Act was materially revised, and the amended
Act went into effect on January 1, 1956. 1955 Ill. Laws 2238 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, §§ 1-93 (1957)). Section 13 of the revised Act intentionally changed the previous law by
providing that all civil actions, both at law and in equity, "shall be commenced by the filing
of a complaint." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13 (1957). In 1981 the Code was enacted and
section 2-201 of the Code (derived from section 13 of the Civil Practice Act) provided that
actions "shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint."
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In the attachment statute, Code section 4-130 (patterned after section 32
of the Practice Act of 1907) provides for the filing of the complaint "10
days before the return day of the order of attachment." This provision
is in complete disharmony with modern court practice in Illinois. Therefore,
part I of article IV of the Code should be amended as follows:
1. In section 4-101, the phrase "when the claim exceeds $20" should
be eliminated. Considering the current purchasing power of $20, the filing
fees which are charged by the clerk of the circuit court, and the fees
charged for service of process by the sheriff, the requirement that the
plaintiff's claim in an attachment motion must exceed $20 is totally unrealistic
and borders on the ridiculous. The phrase "when the claim exceeds $20"
should therefore be deleted. Additionally, in the numbered paragraphs 6
and 7 of section 4-101 the word "affidavit" should be deleted and the
phrase "verified complaint" inserted in its place since the first document
to be filed in the case will be the "verified complaint" and not the
"affidavit."
2. In section 4-104, provision should be made for the filing of a sworn
complaint. Section 4-104 draws an arbitrary distinction between tort and
non-tort actions. It is noteworthy that section 4-201 draws no similar
distinction regarding the attachments of watercraft. 70 Section 4-201 covers
both tort and contract actions. Therefore, the last two unnumbered par-
agraphs of section 4-104 should be deleted.
3. Code section 4-105 contains a form of affidavit which the plaintiff
is now required to file as the first document in the attachment action. The
form is replete with details which normally belong in a complaint. By
contrast, it is noteworthy that Attachment of Watercraft (Code sections 4-
204) and Replevin (Code section 19-104), both of which are actions for
the seizure of property prior to final judgment and are commenced by a
"verified complaint," require no redundant affidavit. Therefore, section 4-
105 should be repealed. This will effect uniformity in the procedure for
seizing property prior to trial.
4. In sections 4-107 and 4-108, reference should be made to the complaint
instead of the affidavit.
5. In an ordinary civil case, the defendant must appear within thirty
days after service of summons. 7' In an attachment action, however, Code
section 4-110 provides that an order for attachment "shall be made returnable
on a return day designated by the plaintiff, which day shall not be less
than 10 days or more than 60 days after its date." This provision is also
anomalous; the injunction and replevin sections permit provisional relief
before a trial on the merits and are governed by the usual thirty-day return
70. Article IV, part 2 of the Code deals with watercraft. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§
4-201 to 4-228 (1983).
71. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 101(d) and 181(a) (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IOA, §§ 101(d),
181(a) (1983)).
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date under Illinois Supreme Court Rules 101(d) and 181(a).72 This fact is
not problematic for the following reasons:
A. Injunction: If a temporary restraining order is entered without notice
to the defendant under Code section 11-101, the defendant "may appear
and move its dissolution or modification."
B. Replevin: Code section 19-105 requires that "[t]he defendant shall
be given 5 days written notice . . of a hearing before the court to
contest the entry of an order for replevin." However, if the court
enters a replevin order without notice to the defendant, Code section
19-106 requires the court to "order a hearing as soon as practical on
the entry of an order for replevin."
C. Attachment: Code section 4-137 provides that "[a]t any time after
the entry of an order for attachment, upon motion of the defendant,
the court shall set a hearing." This section further provides that "[t]he
order for attachment shall be vacated unless the plaintiff shows by a
preponderance of evidence that a cause for the entry of the order exists,
and unless the plaintiff demonstrates to the court the probability that
he, she or it will ultimately prevail in the action."
Considering the provision in Code section 4-137, the abnormal ten to sixty
day return date, instead of the usual thirty-day return day, is obviously
a useless provision which should be eliminated.
6. Section 4-113 fails to recognize that the particular land involved may
be registered under "AN ACT concerning land titles" (Torrens), 7 in which
event recordation with the Recorder of the County, and not with the
Registrar of Titles, would be a useless gesture. Furthermore, the recording
task should be cast upon the plaintiff in the attachment proceeding, not
upon the sheriff.
7. In section 4-114, the fifth sentence should be deleted; it would not
apply if the action is commenced by the filing of a sworn complaint, as
recommended in section 4-104.
8. Section 4-117 is grossly deficient because it does not provide for
emergency action by the court and other officials on Saturdays, holidays,
or other days when the courts are closed. This section should be redrafted
and patterned after section 11-106 of the Code covering injunctive relief
on Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays.
9. In section 4-120, the phrase "within 90 days after such judgment"
was corresponded to the ninety day appeal period that prevailed in Illinois
from January 1, 1934, to December 31, 1955. 74 Since 1965, the appeal
period has been and remains thirty days.75 The "90 days" should therefore
be updated with the phrase "30 days."
72. Id.
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 45-148 (1983).
74. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 200 (1935); id. § 200 (1953).
75. Id. § 76 (1965); ILL. SuP. CT. R. 303 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, § 303(a)
(1983)).
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10. In the first sentence of section 4-122, the words "except" and
"exception" should be corrected to read "object" and "objections," re-
spectively. This correction will coordinate the terminology which is employed
in section 4-123. In the second sentence of section 4-122, the phrase "as
is now provided by law for bail against their principal where a judgment
is paid or satisfied by them" refers to the special statutory proceeding
formerly provided in section 21 of "AN ACT concering bail in civil cases
' 7 6
which Act was repealed in 1963.11 Therefore, the second sentence of section
4-122 should be corrected.
11. Section 4-130 should be repealed. Section 4-104 would then provide
for the commencement of the attachment action by the filing of a sworn
complaint.
12. Section 4-131 should read: "Pleadings. The defendant may plead in
the action as in other civil cases." The remaining text in that section should
be eliminated, because a prompt hearing at the option of the defendant
regarding the propriety of the entry of an attachment order is provided
adequately in section 4-137.
13. In section 4-132, the word "complaint" should be substituted for
the word "affidavit" in two places.
14. Section 4-134 is grossly insufficient. This section fails to provide an
opportunity to file responsive pleadings to the allegations of the intervenor,
and further fails to provide for a bench trial. It directly conflicts with
Code section 2-1105 and disregards the Jury Commissioners Act 78 as well.
15. In section 4-137, the word "complaint" should be substituted for
the word "affidavit".
16. In section 4-140, the word "affidavit" should be deleted, and the
phrase "sworn complaint" should be inserted instead.
17. Section 4-143 places an enormous burden on the clerks of court and
empowers them with judicial authority, raising a serious constitutional
question as to the validity of the section.7 9 Furthermore, federal judgment
creditors whose judgments were entered in federal courts sitting in Illinois,
and whose judgments became liens by recordation as provided in sections
12-501 and 12-502 of the Code, do not share in these proceeds. Thus,
section 4-143 discriminates against federal judgment creditors. This dis-
crimination violates equal protection of the law under both the Illinois and
the United States Constitutions and requires a practical solution. As the
Supreme Court noted in King v. Order of United Travelers of America,
"[a] federal court adjudicating a matter of state law in a diversity suit is
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16, § 21 (1961).
77. 1963 Ill. Laws 3240.
78. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, §§ 24-35 (1983).
79. See Hall v. Marks, 34 III. 358 (1864); see also Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145,
105 N.E.2d 713 (1952) (discussed in H. FINS, GUIDE TO ILLINOIS CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
525 (1981)).
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in effect, only another court of that State." 80 In Hughes v. Fetter8' and
First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc.,82 the United
States Supreme Court found state statutes invalid because they discriminated
against causes of actions arising in sister states. Obviously, discrimination
by a state against federal judgment creditors presents a situation that violates
the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. 3 Therefore, Section
4-143 should be repealed, leaving all judicial authority with the court, as
reenforced by section 4-142.
2. Part 2 of Article IV
A three-judge United States district court held that the Illinois Attachment
Act was unconstitutional in Hernandez v. Danaher.84 The district court opin-
ion discussed the Supreme Court cases condemning self-help and cited, inter
alia, Sniadach v. Family Financial Corp.,85 and Fuentes v. Shevin.16 The dis-
trict court then held that the Illinois Attachment Act patently violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
on its face. 87
Public Act 81-738, effective September 16, 1979,88 amended the Attachment
Act (now article IV part 1 of the Code.) Part 1 of article IV requires a pre-
liminary court hearing before property may be seized, and further provides
for an early hearing at the defendant's request.
These constitutional requirements are completely lacking in article IV, part
2 of the Code. This section was formerly the Attachment of Watercraft Act. 9
To remedy this constitutional deficiency, section 4-205 should be amended by
incorporating the substance of sections 4a, 4b, and 4c of the former Replevin
Act, 90 as amended in 1973 by Public Act 78-287, 91 in order to comply with
the Supreme Court's decision in Fuentes v. Shevin. 92
Section 4-206 also needs revision for coordination with the proposed sec-
tion 4-206 by deleting the phrase "the filing of such complaint and bond"
80. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153, 161 (1948);
see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945); H. FINS, supra note 79, at 525.
81. 341 U.S 609, 611 (1951).
82. 342 U.S. 396, 398 (1952)
83. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
84. 405 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. I11. 1975), aff'd, 440 U.S. 951 (1978).
85. 395 U.S. 335 (1969).
86. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
87. 405 F. Supp. at 757, 762.
88. Pub. Act. No. 81-738, § 1, 1979 II1. Laws 2664 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
§§ 4-101 to 4-145 (1983)).
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 12, §§ 1-47 (1981).
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 119, §§ 1-28 (1981).
91. Pub. Act. No. 78-287, § I, 1973 Ill. Laws 986 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§
19-101 to 19-128 (1983)).
92. See supra note 86.
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and inserting, instead, the phrase "compliance by the plaintiff with the re-
quirements hereinabove provided."
In light of the above situation, it is obvious that this matter merits prompt
attention. A bill to accomplish this objective is herewith submitted:
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend article IV of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved Au-
gust 19, 1981, as amended, and to repeal sections 4-105, 4-130 and 4-143
thereof.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly:
Section 1. Sections 4-101, 4-104, 4-107, 4-108, 4-110, 4-113, 4-114, 4-117,
4-120, 4-122, 4-131, 4-132, 4-134, 4-137, 4-140, 4-205, and 4-206 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, approved August 19, 1981, as amended, are amended to
read as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 4-101)
Sec. 4-101. Cause. In any court having competent jurisdiction, a creditor
having a money claim, whether liquidated or unliquidated, and whether
sounding in contract or tort, is entitled to may have an order for attachment
against the property of his or her debtor, or that of any one or more of several
debtors, either at the time of commencement of the action or thereafter when
the .laim e ,-,,ds $20, in any one of the following instances eases:
1. Where the debtor is not a resident of this State.
2. When the debtor conceals himself or herself or stands in defiance of an
officer, so that process cannot be served upon him or her.
3. Where the debtor has departed from this State with the intention of hav-
ing his or her effects removed from this State.
4. Where the debtor is about to depart from this State with the intention
of having his or her effects removed from this State.
5. Where the debtor is about to remove his or her property from this State
to the injury of such creditor.
6. Where the debtor has within 2 years preceding the filing of the verified
complaint affidavit required, fraudulently conveyed or assigned his or her
effects, or a part thereof, so as to hinder or delay his or her creditors.
7. Where the debtor has, within 2 years prior to the filing of such verified
complaint a-ffida it, fraudulently concealed or disposed of his or her property
so as to hinder or delay his or her creditors.
8. Where the debtor is fraudulently about to frau.dulenty conceal, assign,
or otherwise dispose of his or her property or effects, so as to hinder or delay
his or her creditors.
9. Where the debt sued for was fraudulently contracted on the part of the
debtor, the .-The statements of the debtor, his or her agent or attorney, which
constitute the fraud, shall have been reduced to writing, and his or her sig-
nature attached thereto, by himself or herself, agent or attorney.
(ch. 110, par. 4-104)
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Sec. 4-104. Complaint Affidait. A plaintiff seeking the entry of an order
for attachment shall file with the court a verified complaint an affidavit bas d
upon the p..s.nal knowledge of the affiant and showing:
1. the amount of the claim, so far as practicable, after allowing all just
credits and set-offs;
2. facts establishing any one or more of the causes set forth in section 4-
101 of this Act;
3. the place of residence of the defendant, if known, and if not known,
that upon diligent inquiry the affiant has been unable to ascertain the place
of residence; and
4. facts establishing the cause of action against the defendant.
The plaintiff shall file an additional statermnt in writing, ith er embodied
inbsveh affidavit or separatly, to the cffcrt that th acetion invoked by suh
affidavit does or does not sound in tort and a designation of the return day
for th e summons to be issued in the action; and the eourt, if it is satisfied
that the affidavit has established a pria fai case, shall ente an order for
in all actions sounding in tort, before an odchr for attahmont is nt rsd,
thce plaintiff, his or her antt or attorny, shall apply to the ircuit court o
the county in which the action is to be brought or is pending and be examined,
under oath, by the court conccrning the causc of action; and, thereupon, the
wuft shall inds upon thc affidavit the amaunt of damages for.. which the
order For attaehmcnt shall be entered, and no greater amount shall be claimed.
(ch. 110, par. 4-107)<
Sec. 4-107. Bond. Before the entry of an order for attachment, as herein-
above stated, the court shall take bond and sufficient security, payable to the
People of the State of Illinois, for the use of the person or persons interested
in the property attached, in double the sum sworn to be due, conditioned for
satisfying all costs which may be awarded to such defendant, or to any others
interested in the proceedings, and all damages and costs which shall be re-
covered against the plaintiff, for wrongfully obtaining the attachment order,
which bond, with the complaint affida it of the plaintiff party cemplainig,
or his, her or its agent or attorney, shall be filed in the court wherein eteilue
the order for attachment is to be entered. Every order for attachment entered
without a bond and-affidavit taken, is hereby declared illegal and void, and
shall be vacated dismissed. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to
require the State of Illinois, or any Department of Government thereof, or
any State officer, to file a bond as plaintiff in any proceeding instituted under
Part I of Article IV of this Act.
(ch. 110, par. 4-108)
Sec. 4-108. Fixing of Bond. The court, upon exparte motion, without no-
tice, supported by complaint atffidaift~ of the plaintiff, his or her agent or
attorney, substantially describing the property to be attached, and the value
thereof, may, if satisfied of the bona fides of the application and sufficiency
of the bond under the circumstances of the case, including proposed gar-
nishments, fix the amount of the bond in double the value of the property
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to be attached, instead of double the sum sworn to be due, and in such event
the order shall direct the officer to attach such specifically described property,
but the value of such property to be attached shall not be in excess of an
amount sufficient to satisfy the debt claimed and costs. The court may require
that such complaint affida4t be supplemented by additional showing, by ap-
praisal or otherwise, as to the value of such property, and may, upon motion
of any party to the action claiming an interest in such property, either before
or after actual attachment, require additional security, or order release of the
attachment to the extent not covered by adequate double security.
(ch. 110, par. 4-110)
Sec. 4-110. Order for attachment. The order for attachment required in the
preceeding section shall be directed to the sheriff (and, for purpose only e,
servie of sumns, to any pers-n authorized to serve summo ns), or in case
the sheriff is interested, or otherwise disqualified or prevented from acting,
to the coroner of the county in which the action is commenced, and shall be
made returnable within 30 days from the service of the order for attachment
en a return day designated by the plaintiff, whieh day shall not be less than
10 days or more than 60 days after its date. Such order shall direct order the
officer to attach so much of the estate, real or personal, of the defendant,
to be found in the county, as shall be of value sufficient to satisfy the debt
and costs, according to the complaint affidavit, but in case any specific prop-
erty of the defendant, found in the county, shall be described in the order,
then the officer shall attach the described property only, and no other prop-
erty. Such estate or property shall be so attached in the possession of the of-
ficer to secure, or so to provide, that the same may be liable to further
proceedings thereupon, according to law. The order shall also direct that the
officer summon the defendant to appear and answer the complaint of the
plaintiff in court at a specified time or, at defendant's option, to appear at
any time prior thereto and move the court to set a hearing on the order for
the attachment or on the complaint a44idavi; and that the officer also sum-
mon any specified garnishees, to be-and appear in court at a specified time
to answer to what may be held by them for the defendant.
(ch. 110, par. 4-113)
Sec. 4-113. Affidavit Certifieate of levy. When an order for attachment is
levied upon any real estate, in any ease, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff
offier making the levy to file an affidavit a ee.ifieate of such fact with the
recorder of the county where such land is situated; or with the registrar of
titles if the real estate levied upon is registered under "An Act concerning
land titles", and from and after the filing of the affidavit saine, such levy
shall take effect, as to creditors and bonafide purchasers, without notice but
and not before.
(ch. 110, par. 4-114)
Sec. 4-114. Serving defendant. The officer shall also serve a certified copy
of the order upon the defendant therein, if he or she can be found, in like
manner as provided for service of summons in other civil cases. Such service
upon the defendant shall be made as soon as possible after the entry of the
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order for attachment upon the property described in the order, but in no event
later than 5 days thereafter. Failure to make such service upon the defendant
within the time provided shall in the absence of good cause shown for such
delay, be grounds for vacating of the attachment order upon motion of the
defendant made at any time. The return of the order shall state the particular
manner in which the order was served. if the , ,rtified copy of the fdr is
served upon the defendant less than 10 days beferc the return day thercof,
the defendant shall not be eompelled to appear or plead until 15 days after
the .turn. day designated in the order. The certified copy of the order for
attachment may be served as a summons upon defendants wherever they may
be found in the State, by any person authorized to serve process in like man-
ner as summons in other civil cases.
(ch. 110, par. 4-117)
Sec. 4-117. Relief Serving on Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. If it shall
appear, by t-he affidavit, that a debtor is actually absconding, or concealed,
or stands in defianee of an offieer duly authorized to arrcst himn or her on
eivil preeess, or has departed this State with the intention of having his or
her effects and personal estate removed out of the State, or intends to depart
with such intention, it shall be lawful for the court to enter an order for at-
tachment, the clerk to issue, and sheriff or other officer to serve a certified
copy of the order for attachment against such debtor, on a Saturday, Sunday,
or legal holiday or on a day when courts are not in session, the same as on
any other day.
(ch. 110, par. 4-120)
Sec. 4-120. Bond or recognizance to pay judgment. Any defendant in at-
tachment, desiring the return of property attached, may, at his or her option,
instead of or in substitution for the bond required in the preceding section,
give like bond and security, in a sum sufficient to cover the amount due debt
.......... es sworn to in behalf of the plaintiff, with all interest, damages
and costs of the action, conditioned that the defendant will pay the plaintiff
the amount of the judgment and costs which may be entered against him or
her in that action, on a final trial, within 30 90 days after such judgment is
shall-be entered or a recognizance, in substance hereinabove stated, may be
taken by the court, and filed of record, in which event ease the court shall
approve of the security and the recognizance made to the plaintiff, and upon
a forfeiture of such recognizance, judgment may be entered and enforced as
in other cases of recognizance. In either case, the attachment shall be dis-
solved, and the property taken restored, and all previous proceedings, either
against the sheriff or against the garnishee, set aside, and the cause shall pro-
ceed as if the defendant had been seasonably served with a summons.
(ch. 110, par. 4-122)
Sec. 4-122. Neglect to return sufficient bond. The plaintiff may, within 30
days after the return of such bond, object exeept to the sufficiency thereof,
reasonable notice of such objection eeepti cn having been given to the sheriff
or other officer who took the same, and if, upon hearing, the court shall ad-
judge such security insufficient, the sueh sheriff shall be subject to the same
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judgment and recovery and have the same liberty of defense as if the sheriff
had been made defendant in the attachment proceedings, unless good and
sufficient security shall be given within such time as may be directed by the
court, and enforcement may be had thereupon as in other cases of judgment
for the payment of money. Whenever the judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
or any part thereof shall be paid or satisfied by aniy such sheriff, he or she
may recover from shall have the sa.. . remedy against the defendant fef the
amount so paid by him or her asided by law fr bail against their
prineipal where a judgment is paid or satisfied by thm.
(ch. 110, par. 4-128)
Sec. 4-128. Default. Defaults may be taken as in other civil cases. Ne-de
Fault or preeeeding shall be taken against any defendant not served with sum
mens within the State and not appearing, unless the first publication or
personal serviee outside of the State be at least 30 days prior te the day at
whieh suceh default or proeeeding is proposed to be taken.
(ch. 110, par. 4-131)
Sec. 4-131. Pleadings. The defendant may plead in the action as in other
civil cases. answer, denying the fats stated in the affidavit upon whi h the
order of attachment was entered which answer shall be -verified by affidavit,
and if, upon the trial thereon, the issue shall be found for the plaintiff, the
defendant may answer the complaint or file a moetion directed thereto as in
other civil eases, but if found for the defendant, the order of attachment shall
be set aside, and the costs of the attachment shall be adjudged against the
plaintiff, but the action shall proceed to final judgment as in othe i vil eases.
(ch. 110, par. 4-132)
Sec. 4-132. Amendments. Subject to the requirements of section 4-137 of
this Act, no order for attachment shall be vacated, nor the property taken
thereon restored, nor any garnishee discharged, nor any bond by him or her
given cancelled, nor any rule entered against the sheriff discharged, on ac-
count of any insufficiency of the original complaint, affidavit order for at-
tachment or attachment bond, if the plaintiff, or some eredible person for
him, her or it shall cause a legal and sufficient complaint affidavit or at-
tachment bond to be filed, or the order to be amended, in such time and
manner as the court shall direct; and in that event the cause shall proceed as
if such proceedings had originally been sufficient.
(ch. 110, par. 4-134)
Sec. 4-134. Intervention. In all cases of attachment, any person other than
the defendant, claiming the property attached, or garnisheed may intervene,
by sworn verifying his or her petition by affidat , without giving bond, but
such property shall not thereby be retaken replevied, and the court shall
promptly immediately (unless good cause shown by either party for a con-
tinuance) direct a jury to be impaneled to inquire into the right of the prop-
erty. In all cases where the court or jury finds for the claimant, and that such
claimant is also entitled to the possession of all or any part of such property,
the court shall enter judgment for such claimant accordingly and order the
property attached or garnished to which such claimant is entitled to be de-
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livered to such claimant, and the payment of his or her costs in such action.
In cases where the court or jury finds find for a claimant but further finds
that such claimant is not then entitled to the possession of any such property,
the s-teh claimant shall be entitled to his or her costs; and where the court
or jury finds find for the plaintiff in the attachment proceeding, the stbeh
plaintiff shall recover his or her costs against the sueh claimant. If the sneh
claimant is a non-resident of the State he or she shall file security for costs
as in other civil cases of non-resident plaintiffs.
(ch. 110, par. 4-137)
Sec. 4-137. Prompt hearing. At any time after the entry of an order for
attachment, upon motion of the defendant, the court shall set a hearing on
the order and complaint or affidavit. The hearing shall be held as soon as
possible after the motion by the defendant, but shall not be more than 5 days
after service of notice on the plaintiff.
At the hearing, either party may introduce affidavits or oral testimony. The
order for attachment shall be vacated unless the plaintiff shows by a pre-
ponderance of evidence that a cause for the entry of the order exists, and
unless the plaintiff demonstrates to the court the probability that he, she or
it will ultimately prevail in the action.
(ch. 110, par. 4-140)
Sec. 4-140. Judgment by default. When the defendant is notified as here-
inabove stated, but not served with an order for attachment within the State,
and does not appear and answer the action, judgment by default may be en-
tered, which may be proceeded upon to final judgment as in other cases of
default, but in no case shall judgment be entered against the defendant for
a greater sum than appears, by the sworn complaint affida-it of the plaintiff,
to have been due at the time of obtaining the order for attachment, with in-
terest, damages and costs; and such judgment shall bind, and enforcement
had against the property, credits and effects attached, and such judgment
shall not be enforced from any other property of the defendant; nor shall such
judgment be any evidence of debt against the defendant in any subsequent
cases.
(ch. 110, par. 4-205)
Sec. 4-205. Procedure. (a) The defendant shall be given 5 days written no-
tice in the manner required by rule of the Supreme Court, of a hearing before
the court to contest the entry of any order for attachment. No order for at-
tachment may be entered nor may property be seized pursuant to any order
for attachment prior to such notice and hearing except as provided in sub-
section (b) of this Section.
As to any property, the right to notice and hearing established in
this Section may not be waived by any consumer. As used in this Sec-
tion, a consumer is an individual who obtained possession of the prop-
erty for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes.
Any waiver of the right to notice and hearing established in this
Section must be in writing and must be given voluntarily, intelli-
gently, and knowingly.
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(b) Notice to the defendant is not required if the plaintiff establishes and
the court finds as a matter of record and supported by evidence that summary
seizure of the property is justified by reason of necessity to:
(1) protect the plaintiff from an immediately impending harm which will
result from the imminent destruction or concealment of the property in de-
rogation of the plaintiff's rights in the property;
(2) protect the plaintiff from an immediately impending harm which will
result from the imminent removal of the property from the state, taking into
consideration the availability of judicial remedies in the event of such re-
moval;
(3) protect the plaintiff from immediately impending harm which will result
from the perishable nature of the property under the particular circumstances
at the time of the action;
(4) protect the plaintiff from an immediately impending harm which will
result from the imminent sale, transfer or assignment of the property to the
extent such sale, transfer or assignment is fraudulent or in derogation of the
plaintiff's rights in the money or other property;
(5) recover the property from a defendant who has obtained possession by
theft.
(c) At the hearing on the entry of an order for attachment which may be
a hearing to contest pursuant to notice under subsection (a) of this Section
or an ex parte hearing pursuant to a finding under subsection (b) of this Sec-
tion the court shall review the basis of the plaintiff's claim. If the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case to the lien on property, and ifthe plaintiff also
demonstrates to the court the probability that he or she will ultimately prevail
on the underlying claim, the court shall so find as a matter of record and an
order for attachment shall be entered by the court.
(d) The plaintiff, or his or her agent or attorney, shall file a bond, payable
to the owner of the craft to be attached, or, if unknown, to the unknown
owners thereof, in at least double the amount of the claim, with security to
be approved by the court, conditioned that the plaintiff shall prosecute his
or her action with effect, or, in case of failure therein, will pay all costs and
damages which the owner or other person interested in such water craft may
sustain, in consequence of the wrongful suing out of such order for attach-
ment, in the same manner as if it had been given to such person by his or
her proper name. Only such persons shall be required to join in such action
as have a joint interest. Others may allege breaches and have assessment of
damages, as in other actions on penal bonds.
Bond. The plaintiff, eir his or her agent or attorney, shall also file with such
eomplaint a bond, payable to the owncr of the eraft to be attaehed, or, ii
un~known, to the unknown ewners thereof, in at least double the amount of
the claim, with seeurity to be approvcd by the elerk, eenditioned that the
plaintiff shall proseeute his or her action with effeet, of, in ease of failufe
thercin, will pay all costs and darnages which the owner or other pc. ni
terested in such water craft may sustain, in eonsequefncc of the wrongful suing
out of such attaehment, which bond may be stied by any owncro pro
interested, in the samce manrncr as if it had been given to such pefsenb i
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or her popr namem. Only su h persons shall be reuircd to join in such suit
as have a joint interest. Others may allege brcaehes and have assessment of
damages, as in other actions on penal bends.
(ch. 110, par. 4-206)
Sec. 4-206. Designation of defendants. Upon compliance by the plaintiff
with the requirements hereinabove provided, the filing of such complaint and
befd, the court eler-k shall enter an order for attachment against the owners
of such water craft, directed to the sheriff of the county, or other officer if
the sheriff is disqualified or unavailable to attach such water craft. Such own-
ers may be designated by their reputed names, surnames, and joint defendants
by their separate or partnership names, or by such names, styles or titles as
they are usually known. If the name of any owner is unknown, he or she may
be designated as unknown owner.
Section 2. Sections 4-105, 4-130, and 4-143 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
approved August 19, 1981, as amended, are repealed.
Section 3. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
Pub. Act 84-631, effective January 1, 1986, removed the word "clerk" and
inserted the word "court" in its place in section 4-205 and 4-206.
J. Section 5-114: Costs in Scire Facias and Prohibition
Section 5-114 of the Code addresses costs in scire facias and prohibition.
1. Scire Facias.
A proceeding by scire facias no longer exists in Illinois. In the past there
were four statutes that employed scire facias:
1) Revival of judgment;93
2) Escheat; 9"
3) Workers' Compensation Act; and"
4) Workers' Occupational Diseases Act. 96
None of the above now employ scire facias.
2. Prohibition.
Section 13 of article IV of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides:
The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law
is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made
applicable shall be a matter of judicial determinations.Y9
In Bridgewater v. Hotz,98 the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
93. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-1601 (1983).
94. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 49, § 3 (1983).
95. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19 (1983).
96. Id. § 172.54.
97. See supra note 19.
98. 51 111. 2d 103, 281 N.E.2d 317 (1972).
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The principal change effected by section 13 is that it specifically rejects
the role enunciated in a long line of decisions of this court that whether a
general law can be made applicable is for the legislature to determine Som-
mers v. Patton (1948), 399 Ill. 540; Trustees v. The Commissioners of Lin-
coin Park (1918), 282 Il1. 348) and specifically provides that 'it shall be a
matter for judicial determination.'"
Because the section applies only to prohibition, it constitutes special legis-
lation that violates the Illinois Constitution.
A bill to make section 5-114 applicable to all cases is herewith submitted:
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend Section 5-114 of the Code Civil Procedure, approved
August 19, 1981, as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly:
Section 1. Section 5-114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved August
19, 1981, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 5-114)
Sec. 5-114. Applicable to all cases. Sir fa.ias and pr.hibitien. In all ac-
tions of sir fa.ias, or prhibitiefn., the plaintiff recovering judgment after
an answer was filed, or a motion directed to the complaint, shall recover his
or her costs of the action. If the action is voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff
or is dismissed for want of prosecution or judgment is entered against the
plaintiff, the defendant shall recover his or her costs.
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
K. Section 5-123: Forfeiture of Clerk's Fees
The provision for forfeiture of clerk's fees in the event of erroneous tax-
ation by the clerk is a vestige of Illinois law when court clerks were fee officers
and retained for themselves whatever fees they collected. Consequently, when
clerks were guilty of an overcharge, they were ordered to return that amount.
Article VI, section 14 of the Illinois Constitution, however, currently provides
that "Itihere shall be no fee officers in the judicial system."' ' Article VI,
section 18(c) of the Illinois Constitution also provides that "[tihe salaries of
clerks and other non-judicial officers shall be as provided by law."'' All fees
collected by circuit court clerks are turned over to the respective county treas-
urers. All fees collected by the appellate and supreme court clerks are turned
over to the State Treasurer. Consequently, the above-quoted provision, which
is directed against the personal finances of individual clerks, should be deleted
from this section.
99. Id. at 110, 281 N.E.2d at 321.
100. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 14.
101. id. § 18(c).
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A bill to eliminate the provision on forfeiture of clerk fees is herewith sub-
mitted:
Proposed Bill.
An Act to amend section 5-123 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved
August 19, 1981, as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly:
Section 1. Section 5-123 of the Code of Civil Procedure, amended, is
amended to read as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 5-123)
Sec. 5-123. Retaxing costs. Any person who is dissatisfied by the taxation
of any bill of costs by the clerk may apply to the court in which the action
or proceeding was had, to retax the same, according to law. If the court finds
any charge allowed for services not performed, or for which the person charged
is not liable, or any item charged higher than is allowed by law, then the court
shall correct such taxation; and if the dissatisfied party has paid such un-
lawful charge, the clerk shall forfeit all fees allewed to the .l.rk for taxation,
and shall pay to the dissatisfied party, out of fees in the possession of the
clerk, the whole amount which such party has paid by reason of the allewing
of-steh unlawful charge.
The above Act became law by Pub. Act No. 84-552, effective Sept. 18,
1985.
L. Code Sections 6-143 through 6-148 are
Obsolete and Unconstitutional
At common law, a person who filed an ejectment action and was successful
in obtaining a judgment of eviction was entitled to file a second action against
the same defendant to recover mesne profits. "Mesne profits" is the "value
of use or occupation of land during the time it was held by one in wrongful
possession and is commonly measured in terms of rents and profits."''0
In 1818, the State of Illinois enacted a statute designed to avoid the ne-
cessity of filing two separate actions to obtain full relief against a defendant
who wrongfully withheld realty from the plaintiff. The legislation permitted
a successful plaintiff to forego filing an action to recover mesne profits, and
allowed the plaintiff to file a "Suggestion of Damages" in the ejectment ac-
tion. 03 In Ringhouse v. Keener, '04 and Nichols v. Bradley, 05 both the Illinois
102. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 893 (5th ed. 1979).
103. AN ACT as to proceedings in ejectment, distress for rent, and tenants at will holding
over. 1819 Ill. Laws 53-59.
104. 63 Ill. 230 (1872).
105. 223 Ill. App. 377 (3d Dist. 1921).
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Supreme Court and the respective appellate courts held that the Suggestion
of Damages under the Ejectment Act"° was a new action in assumpsit and
not a continuation of the ejectment action. 07
The Ejectment Act was incorporated into the Code and now appears as
Article VI. In order to effect uniformity in terminology throughout the Code,
however, the "Suggestion" was renamed "Petition." Thus, this aspect of the
law remained unchanged.
Code section 6-133 is entitled "Petition for Damages." Section 6-134 is
entitled "Petition Stands as Complaint." Section 6-135 is entitled "Service
of copy of petition." Section 6-136 is entitled "Pleadings" and provides that
"[tihe pleadings following the filing of the petition and the proceedings thereon
shall be the same as in ordinary civil actions .. . . " Section 6-137 is entitled
"Issue of Fact on Petition" and provides as follows:
If any issue of fact is presented on such petition, it shall be tried as in other
civil cases; and if such issue is found for the plaintiff, [or] if demand for
trial by jury has been made in accordance with law, a jury may assess dam-
ages in the amount of the mesne profits received by the defendant since he
or she entered into possession of the premises, subject to the restrictions
contained in Article V1 of this Act.
After the filing of the petition (formally called "suggestion"), Code sec-
tions 6-143 through 6-148 (derived from Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 45 section 56
through 61 (1979)) allow the court to appoint a commission of seven persons.
Section 6-146 provides that the commission has the "power and authority to
call witnesses, and administer the necessary oaths, and to examine them for
the ascertainment of any fact material to the inquiry and assessment . .. ."
The Illinois legislature must now determine whether the commission should
be continued in view of the following developments.
1. The Illinois Constitution Prohibits Fee Officers
Article VI, section 14 of the Illinois Constitution contains the following
prohibition: "There shall be no fee officers in the judicial system." Section
6-147 of the Code, however, provides: "The commissioners, in making every
estimate of value, by virtue of Article VI of this Act, shall state, separately,
the result of each; and the court has power to make such allowance to the
commissioners as is just-which allowance shall be taxed and collected as
costs." It is questionable whether this fee system is constitutionally valid. Ob-
viously, the commissioners will not render any services without compensation.
2. The Ejectment Act Infinges on the Right to Jury Trial and the
Separation of Powers
The statutory provision for the commission system has existed since Illi-
nois' inception in 1818. In the Illinois Acts of 1819, this provision appeared
106. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 45 (Cahill 1921).
107. 63 111. at 234; 223 Ill. App. at 379.
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under the title "An Act concerning occupying claimants of Lands."',0 8 Pro-
visions for commissions appeared under the same title in the Illinois Acts of
1829'09 and in the Revised Laws of Illinois of 1833.110 The provision was in-
corporated as sections 55 through 61 of the Ejectment Act'" in the Illinois
Revised Statutes of 1845, and continued in that form in the Illinois Revised
Statutes in 1874.12 Thereafter, the commission system continued as part of
the Ejectment Act until 1982, when the Ejectment Act was converted into
Article VI of the Code.'' 3
In Ross v. Irving, "4 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Ejectment Act
was constitutional. However, in Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Asso-
ciation.," 5 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a similar quasi-judicial body
was unconstitutional. The court determined that the Ejectment Act infringed
upon the constitutional right to trial by jury, and violated the constitutional
mandate of separation of powers because it vested judicial authority in non-
judicial personnel. 16
3. The Judicial Article of 1962 Effectively Abolished the Commission
Although the commission for determining "mesne profits" has existed since
Illinois became a state, the commission has been involved in only a few re-
ported cases.
In 1852, the Illinois Supreme Court found the Ejectment Act and the com-
mission to be constitutional in Ross v. Irving."' In this connection, it is in-
teresting to observe the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bank of
Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee,II which arose in an Ohio federal court. Dud-
ley's Lessee involved an occupation law. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the
opinion for the Court, and held that the provision for assessing the value of
improvements by commissioners was repugnant to the seventh amendment of
the United States Constitution. "9
108. AN ACT concerning occupying claimants of Land. 1819 Ill. Laws 40-43.
109. AN ACT concerning occupying claimants of Land. 1829 Ill. Laws 98-102.
110. REVISED LAWS OF ILLINOIS 416-19 (1833).
111. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 36, §§ 55-61 (1845).
112. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 45, §§ 58-60 (1874).
113. Pub. Act No. 82-280, article VI, 1981 Ill. Laws 1382, 1458-1467 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, §§ 6-101 to 6-150 (1983)).
114. 14 Ill. 171 (1852).
115. 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
116. Id. at 321, 347 N.E.2d at 741.
117. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
118. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492 (1829).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. VII provides: "In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States than
according to the rules of the common law."
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In 1860, in Montag v. Lynn,'2" a litigant moved to appoint commissioners
to assess the value of certain improvements. The trial court refused to appoint
the commissioners. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
We think that the defendant in ejectment was in time to make the appli-
cation for the appointment of commissioners at the time he made his mo-
tion. This is the part of the section of the law presenting the question: "The
court who shall pronounce and give judgment of eviction, either in law or
equity, shall at the time nominate seven fit persons, any five of whom shall
have power, and it shall be their duty to go on the premises, and after view-
ing the same, on oath or affirmation, to assess the value of all such lasting
and valuable improvements, which shall have been made thereon prior to
the receipt of such notice as aforesaid," etc.. The question is, whether the
time here specified for the appointment of commissioners is directory or
imperative. We think from the nature of the case it was only designed to
be directory, at least where the judgment is appealed to this court, as was
the case here. The appeal suspended the operation of the judgment until
the case should be decided by this court.' 2'
In 1862, in Montag v. Linn, 2' the litigant again moved to appoint com-
missioners, and the trial court denied the motion. The Illinois Supreme Court
reversed and ordered the appointment of commissioners.
In the 1887 decision of Haslett v. Crain,'23 certain commissioners were ap-
pointed and filed their report with the court. The plaintiffs moved to quash
the report on several grounds. 2 4 The court denied the motion and the plain-
tiffs appealed. The Illinois Supreme Court said:
It is claimed that the report of the commissioners, as respects the finding
upon the evidence, is final, as the statute has not pointed out any mode of
taking objection thereto. The proceeding is a judicial one, an incident to
a legal suit within the ordinary jurisdiction of the court, the commissioners
being appointed by the court at the time of giving judgment of eviction,
and being required to lodge their report with the clerk of the court, and
the judgment of the court is afterward to be entered thereon. We are of
opinion that it is to be held subject to the supervision of the court, and
liable to be expected to in the mode done here.
We think the court below erred in refusing the motion to quash the re-
port, and the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.'2-
Apparently the commissioners occupied a position almost identical with that
of a master in chancery. In the Judicial Article of 1962, which took effect
on January 1, 1964, section 8 provided: "There shall be no masters in chan-
120. 25 111. 154 (1861).
121. Id. at 155.
122. 27 Ill. 328 (1862).
123. 85 111. 129 (1877).
124. Id. at 130.
125. Id. at 132-33.
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cery or other fee officers in the judicial system."'' 26 In 1965, the Illinois leg-
islature repealed the statutes dealing with masters in chancery and referees. 127
Masters in chancery were extinct in Illinois by the time the Illinois Consti-
tution of 1970 was drafted, and Article VI, section 14 of the Illinois Con-
stitution stated this prohibition in the following form: "There shall be no fee
officers in the judicial system."' 28
Also, in 1939, a quarter of a century before the Judicial Article of 1962
took effect, a litigant in Maynard v. Stevens, 2 9 moved during the trial to ap-
point commissioners. The trial court struck the motion and the Illinois Su-
preme Court affirmed.
There have not been any reported cases in Illinois involving commissioners
under the Ejectment Act since January 1, 1964, the date when the Judicial
Article of 1962 took effect. Therefore, the commission system for determin-
ing "mesne profits" is long dead and is merely waiting for a respectable burial
by repeal in the Illinois legislature.
A bill to accomplish this objective is herewith submitted:
Proposed Bill
An Act to repeal sections 6-143, 6-144, 6-145, 6-146, 6-147 and 6-148 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, approved August 19, 1981, as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly:
(ch. 110, rep. pars. 6-143 through 6-148)
Section 1. Sections 6-143, 6-144, 6-145, 6-146, 6-147 and 6-148 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, approved August 19, 1981, as amended, are repealed.
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
The above sections were repealed by Pub. Act No. 84-623, effective Sept.
20, 1985. No new legislation will be needed to fill the gap of the above re-
pealed six sections, because Code section 6-137 provides that when an issue
of fact is involved in a proceeding under a petition to recover "mesne profits,"
the case shall be tried by the court or by a jury "as in other civil cases."
Code section 6-137 reads as follows:
Issue of fact on petition. If any issue of fact is presented on such petition,
it shall be tried as in other civil cases; and if such issue is found for the
plaintiff, or if demand for trial by jury has been made in accordance with
law, a jury may assess damages in the amount of the mesne profits received
by the defendant since he or she entered into possession of the premises,
subject to the restrictions contained in Article VI of this Act.
In Guide to Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, the author commented that:
126. Judicial Article of 1962, ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
127. 1965 Ill. Laws 3594-95.
128. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
129. 370 III. 594, 19 N.E.2d 575 (1939).
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This section is derived from Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, Ch. 45, Par. 48, without
change in the substance of the text. The term "suggestion" was substituted
by "petition" in order to specify the precise pleading which is to be filed.
This coordinates the practice under this section with the practice under Sec-
tion 12 of the Injunction Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, Ch. 69, Par. 12) as
amended in 1979 (Public Act 81-232).11°
No reported Illinois case has cited the above section 6-137 or its predecessor.
M. Section 7-102: Procedure in Condemnation
It has been the practice in Illinois for a condemnee, who contests an em-
inent domain proceeding on the ground that the condemnation is not for a
necessary public use or is otherwise unauthorized by law, to file two docu-
ments: a motion to dismiss, and a traverse. Thus in City of Carbondale v.
Yehling, '33 the Illinois Supreme Court said:
On March 18, 1982, the city of Carbondale filed several petitions for
condemnation in the circuit court of Jackson County. Defendants Mary
Lou Atwood and Atwood Drugs, Inc., filed a motion to dismiss and trav-
erse asserting that the city of Carbondale lacked legislative authority to ac-
quire the premises sought to be taken under sections 11-74.3-4 and 11-74.4-
3 of the Illinois Muniipal Code (I11. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24 pars. 11-74.3-
4, 11-74.4-3), and alleged that ordinances 81-105 and 82-06 were void since
they constituted an improper use of home rule authority, were not au-
thorized by State law, and were unconstitutional under both the United
States and Illinois constitutions.
The judgment of the circuit court of Jackson County granting the
defendants' motion to dismiss is affirmed." 2
Black's Law Dictionary 33 says:
In common law pleading, a traverse signifies a denial. Thus, where a
defendant denies any material allegation of fact in the plaintiff's decla-
ration, he is said to traverse it and the plea itself is thence frequently termed
a "traverse.''"14
In Eminent Domain in Illinois,3 Righeimer states:
Questions as to the necessity of the taking, whether the taking is for public
use, whether a bona fide attempt to agree has been made, and any and all
other questions affecting the right of the petitioner to maintain the par-
ticular proceeding should be raised by traverse or motion to dismiss. A trav-
erse denies the allegations of the petition to condemn and places upon the
petitioner the burden of sustaining them. The motion to dismiss generally
points out certain specific objections that the property owner has to the
proceeding. Either is a proper method of raising the question of the right
of the condemnor to proceed.36
130. H. FINs, supra note 79, at 223.
131. 96 Ill. 2d 495, 451 N.E.2d 837 (1983).
132. Id. at 496, 451 N.E.2d at 838 (emphasis added).
133. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 102.
134. Id. at 1345.
135. F. RIGHEIMER, EMINENT DOMAIN IN ILLINOIS (2d ed. 1972).
136. Id. at 34.
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It is, therefore, proposed that Section 7-102 be amended to read as shown
in the following proposed bill.
The issue presented by a condemnee's motion to dismiss resembles a
defendant's motion to dismiss under Code section 2-615 (former section 45
of the Civil Practice Act) or under Code section 2-619 (former section 48 of
the Civil Practice Act). The traverse is an obvious vestige of common law
pleading, which has been abolished in Illinois. There is no valid reason why
two documents are required when only one document amply accomplishes the
same objective.
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend section 7-102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved
August 19, 1981, as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly:
Section 1. Section 7-102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved August
19, 1981, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 7-102)
Sec. 7-102. Parties. Where the right to take private property for public use,
without the owner's consent or the right to construct or maintain any public
road, railroad, plankroad, turnpike road, canal or other public work or im-
provement, or which may damage property not actually taken has been here-
tofore or shall hereafter be conferred by general law or special charter upon
any corporate or municipal authority, public body, officer or agent, person,
commissioner or corporation and the compensation to be paid for or in re-
spect of the property sought to be appropriated or damaged for the purposes
mentioned cannot be agreed upon by the parties interested, or in case the
owner of the property is incapable of consenting, or the owner's name or
residence is unknown, or the owner is a nonresident of the state, the party
authorized to take or damage the property so required, or to construct, op-
erate and maintain any public road, railroad, plankroad, turnpike road, canal
or other public work or improvement, may apply to the circuit court of the
county where the property or any part thereof is situated, by filing with the
clerk a complaint, setting forth, by reference, his, her or their authority in
the premises, the purpose for which the property is sought to be taken or
damaged, a description of the property, the names of all persons interested
therein as owners or otherwise as appearing of record, if known, or if not
known stating that fact and praying such court to cause the compensation to
be paid to the owner to be assessed. If it appears that any person not in being,
upon coming into being, is, or may become or may claim to be, entitled to
any interest in the property sought to be appropriated or damaged the court
shall appoint some competent and disinterested person as guardian ad litem,
to appear for and represent such interest in the proceeding and to defend the
proceeding on behalf of the person not in being, and any judgment entered
in the proceeding shall be as effectual for all purposes as though the person
was in being and was a party to the proceeding. If the proceeding seeks to
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affect the property of persons under guardianship, the guardians shall be made
parties defendant. Persons interested, whose names are unknown, may be
made parties defendant by the same descriptions and in the same manner as
provided in other civil cases. Where the property is sought to be taken or
damaged by the state for the purposes of establishing, operating or main-
taining any state house or state charitable or other institutions or improve-
ments, the complaint shall be signed by the governor or such other person
as he or she shall direct, or as is provided by law. No property belonging to
a railroad or other public utility subject to the jurisdiction of the Illinois Com-
merce Commission may be taken or damaged, pursuant to the provisions of
Article VII of this Act, without the prior approval of the Illinois Commerce
Commission.
A condemnee who desires to contest the proceeding on the ground that the
condemnation is not for a necessary public use or is otherwise unauthorized
by law, shall raise the issue by a motion to dismiss the action. No traverse
is required, and the court shall adjudicate all issues of law or fact raised by
such motion.
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
N. Section 8-402: Production of Books and Writings
Section 8-402 of the Code is derived from Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, par. 9,
without change in text, although a previously omitted section heading was
supplied.
Section 9 of the Evidence Act of 1872111 required the litigant to produce
books and writings upon notice, motion showing good and sufficient cause,
and a court order. This procedural subject is covered by Illinois Supreme Court
Rules 204, 214 and 237,38 which require neither motion nor court order for
the production of books and writings. Consequently, a procedural conflict
exists between section 9 of the Evidence Act and the Supreme Court Rules.
When such a conflict exists, the rule predominates and the statute is invalid. 9
Therefore, section 8-402 requires amendment.
First, the phrase "upon motion and good and sufficient cause shown, and
reasonable notice thereof given," should be deleted. Second, the word "either"
should be changed to "any." Third, the phrase "or power" should correctly
read "or control." Fourth, the word "the" should be changed to "any."
Lastly, the phrase "as provided by Supreme Court Rules" should be added
at the end of the section.
These suggested amendments to section 8-402 are supported by legislative
precedent. The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. Jackson 40 held
invalid section 115-4(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 because
137. Section 9 of the Evidence Act of 1872 is codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 9 (1979).
138. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 204, 214, 237 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, §§ 204, 214, 237
(1983)).
139. People v. Jackson, 69 Il1. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977). See also People v. Cox, 82
III. 2d 268, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980).
140. 69 111. 2d 252,371 N.E.2d 602 (1977).
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the statutory provision was in conflict with a Supreme Court rule., 4' The leg-
islature thereafter amended subsection (f) as follows: "After examination by
the court the jurors may be examined, passed upon, accepted and tendered
by opposing counsel as provided by Supreme Court Rules. 142
A bill to coordinate section 8-402 with the Illinois Supreme Court Rules
on the production of books and writings is herewith submitted:
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend section 8-402 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved
August 19, 1981, as amended, is amended as follows:
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly:
Section 1. Sec. 8-402 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved August 19,
1981, as amended, is amended as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 8-402)
Sec. 8-402. Production of books and writings. The circuit courts shall have
power, in any action pending before them upon motion, and good and suf
Ficint aus shown, and rasnabl, notie thereof giY, to require the par-
ties, or any either of them, to produce books or writings in their possession
or control of poweir which contain evidence pertinent to any t-he issue as pro-
vided by the Supreme Court Rules.
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
0. Section 9-108: Premises Used for Residential Purposes
In Twin-City Inn, Inc. v. Hahn E. Enterprises,'43 the Illinois Supreme Court
held section 9-108 of the Code to be applicable to commercial as well as res-
idential real estate. Consequently, the reference to "premises used for resi-
dence purposes" is misleading and should be eliminated. Additionally, if the
statutory provision involved was limited to residential real estate and excluded
commercial real estate, the provision would constitute special legislation in
violation of article IV, section 13 of the Illinois Constitution.
In order to make section 9-108 applicable to any case brought under Article
IX, the following bill is herewith submitted:
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend section 9-108 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved
August 19, 1981, as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly:
Section 1. Section 9-108 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved August
19, 1981, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
141. Id. at 671, 371 N.E.2d at 606 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-4(f) (1963)).
142. Pub. Act No. 81-263, § I, 1979 Ill. Laws § 1369 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
115-4(0 (1983)).
143. 37 Ill. 2d 133, 225 N.E.2d 630 (1967); see also Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363
(1974).
19851
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(ch. 110, par. 9-108)
Sec. 9-108. Jury trial. In any case brought under Article IX of this Act,
a rclating to premises used fer rc.id.n.. purp.s.s, ither party may demand
trial by jury, notwithstanding any waiver of jury trial contained in any lease
or contract.
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
P. Sections 10-106 and 10-125: Liability of Judges
The second sentence of Section 10-106 of the Code reads as follows:
Any judge empowered to grant relief by habeas corpus who shall corruptly
refuse to grant the relief when legally applied for in a case where it may
lawfully be granted, or who shall for the purpose of oppression unreason-
ably delay the granting of such relief shall, for every offense, forfeit to the
prisoner or party affected a sum not exceeding $1,000.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently held that
a state court judge may not be held liable in damages for the duties performed
while acting in the capacity as a judicial officer, even if the judge acted ma-
liciously. 44 In view of these decisions, the above quoted sentence should be
removed.
If an Illinois judge wilfully fails or refuses to perform his or her duty, the
most effective remedial means is to present the matter to the Courts Com-
mission. The Commission has the authority, by virtue of article VI, section
15(e) of the Illinois Constitution, "to remove from office, suspend without
pay, censure or reprimand a judge or associate judge for wilful misconduct
in office, persistent failure to perform his duties, or other conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice or that brings the judicial office
into disrepute." 4 5
Similarly, the last sentence of Code section 10-125 states as follows: "If
any judge shall neglect or refuse to bind any such prisoner or witness by re-
cognizance, or to return a recognizance when taken as hereinabove stated, he
or she shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor in office, and be proceeded
against accordingly." This sentence should also be deleted for the above stated
reasons.
To eliminate the, unlawful sanctions imposed against judges by section 10-
106 and 10-125 of the Code, the following bill is herewith submitted:
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend sections 10-106 and 10-125 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, approved August 18, 1981, as amended.
144. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union
of U.S., 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (I Wall.) 335 (1872).
145. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(e).
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Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly:
Section 1. Sections 10-106 and 10-125 of the Code of Civil Procedure, ap-
proved August 18, 1981, as amended, are amended to read as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 10-106)
Sec. 10-106. Grant of relief Penalty. Unless it shall appear from the com-
plaint itself, or from the documents thereto annexed, that the party can nei-
ther be discharged, admitted to bail nor otherwise relieved, the court or judge
shall forthwith award relief by habeas corpus. Any judge m.powered to grant
relief by habeas corpus who shall corruptly refuse to grant the relief when
legally applied for in a ease where it may lawfully be gantd, or who shall
for the purpose of oppres in uncaonbly delay the granting of such rclicf
shall, for evefry such effense, forfeit to the prisoner or party affeeted a sumn
not emeeeding $1,000.
(ch. 110, par. 10-125)
Sec. 10-125. New commitment. In all cases where the imprisonment is for
a criminal, or supposed criminal matter, if it appears to the court that there
is sufficient legal cause for the commitment of the prisoner, although such
commitment may have been informally made, or without due authority, or
the process may have been executed by a person not duly authorized, the court
shall make a new commitment in proper form, and direct it to the proper
officer, or admit the party to bail if the case is bailable. The court shall also,
when necessary, take the recognizance of all material witnesses against the
prisoner, as in other cases. The recognizances shall be in the form provided
by law, and teturned as other recognizances. if any judge shall ncglct -or
refus. to bind any such prisoner or witness by rognizanc,, or to rcturn a
.... when tak... as hI.inabov stated, he or she shall be guilty of
a Class A mnisdeman r in offic, and be proc d. d against accordingly .
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
Q. Section 11-101: Signed Orders
1. Use of "Entry" is Ambiguous
Judgments at law could be rendered orally prior to the constitutional merger
of law and equity in Illinois on January 1, 1964. Decrees in equity, however,
had to be in writing and signed by the chancellor 46 because the application
for a temporary restraining order 47 was a chancery proceeding. The use of
signed docufnents for temporary restraining orders remains the prevailing
practice to date in Illinois. Careful attention must be focused on the precise
time when a written order signed by the court becomes effective.
146. Freeport Motor Casualty Co. v. Tharp, 406 I11. 295, 94 N.E.2d 139 (1950).
147. Prior to 1967, a temporary injunction included what is now a temporary restraining
order and a preliminary injunction.
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Illinois Supreme Court Rule 272 provides: "If at the time of announcing
final judgment the judge requires the submission of a form of written judg-
ment to be signed by him, the clerk shall make a notation to that effect and
the judgment becomes final only when the signed judgment is filed."' 48
It should be apparent that as to final judgments, "entry of record" means
"filing of the judge's signed document by the clerk of court." There is no
valid reason why a signed interlocutory order should require greater formality
than a final judgment which must also be signed by the judge.
Unfortunately, the term "entered of record" is ambiguous. Corpus Juris
Secundum comments that in this context "enter" means to place anything
before a court, or upon or among the records, in a formal and regular man-
ner, and usually in writing, as to "enter an appearance," to "enter a judg-
ment," and so to make a record of, and not merely to announce. 49 In this
sense, the word is nearly equivalent to setting down formally in writing, in
either a full or abridged form. It may, however, be used as meaning simply
to file or duly deposit or render.1' °
It is necessary to avoid any ambiguity as to when the ten day period expires
in the event the court grants an emergency restraining order in the clerk's
absence. Thus, the word "entry" should be substituted with the phrase "the
signing of the order."
Accordingly, the second sentence of section 11-101 should be amended as
follows:
Every temporary restraining order granted without notice shall be signed
by the court and endorsed with the date and hour of signing issuanee; shall
be filed forthwith in the clerk's office and drt . , record; shall define
the injury and state why it is irreparable and why the order was granted
without notice; and shall expire by its terms within such time after the sign-
.ing of the order entry, not to exceed 10 days, as the court fixes, unless within
the time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended for a like
period or unless the party against whom the order is directed consents that
it may be extended for a longer period.
2. Reasons for Extensions should be in Orders
The third sentence of Code section 11-101 provides that if an extension of
the injunctive period is granted, the reasons for the extension shall be "en-
tered of record." The court must determine whether the grounds for ex-
tending the injunction are sufficient, whereas the "entering of record" is the
clerk's function.' 5 ' Obviously the sentence that states "[t]he regsons for the
extension shall be entered of record" constitutes a misjoinder of functions
148. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 272 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A § 272 (1983)).
149. 30 C.J.S. Enter, at 713 (1965). The above text is quoted with approval in Neiman v.
City of Chicago, 37 II1. App. 2d 309, 323 185 N.E.2d 358, 365 (Ist Dist. 1962).
150. Id.
151. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 25, § 14 (1983).
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which are performed by two separate persons. Therefore, this sentence should
require that "The reasons for the granting of the extension shall be stated in
the written order of the court."
3. Removal of Colloquialisms
In the fourth sentence of Code section 11-101 the phrase "the motion for
a preliminary injunction shall be set down for hearing at the earliest possible
time" appears. The word "down" in this setting is colloquial and should be
deleted.
4. Use of "Issuance" is Ambiguous
Code section 2-1501 provides for the availability of "a temporary restrain-
ing order" by a copy "certified by the clerk of the court." Thus, the court
enters the temporary restraining order, and the clerk certifies the order and
issues it to the person by whom it is requested. Therefore, the word "issu-
ance," which appears in the last paragraph of Code section 11-101, should
be substituted with the word "entry."
The word "issuance" in section 11-101 is inconsistent with the injunctional
provision of section 11-103, which provides that the court "may before en-
tering a restraining order ... require the applicant to give bond .... "
A bill to clarify and correct section 11-101 of the Code is herewith sub-
mitted:
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend section 11-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved
August 19, 1982, as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly:
Section 1. Section 11-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved August
19, 1981, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 11-101)
Sec. 11-101. Temporary restraining order. No temporary restraining order
shall be granted without notice to the adverse party unless it clearly appears
from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that im-
mediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the applicant
before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon. Every temporary re-
straining order granted without notice shall be signed by the court and in-
dorsed with the date and hour of signing issuanee; shall be filed forthwith
in the clerk's office and entered of re,,rd, shall define the injury and state
why it is irreparable and why the order was granted without notice; and shall
expire by its terms within such time after the signing of the order ent'y, not
152. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § I1-103 (1983) (emphasis added).
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to exceed 10 days, as the court fixes, unless within the time so fixed the order,
for good cause shown, is extended for a like period or unless the party against
whom the order is directed consents that it may be extended for a longer pe-
riod. The reasons for the granting of the extension shall be stated in the writ-
ten order of the court ,ntercd of fee, . In case a temporary restraining order
is granted without notice, the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be
set down for hearing at the earliest possible time and takes precedence over
all matters except older matters of the same character; and when the motion
comes on for hearing the party who obtained the temporary restraining order
shall proceed with the application for a preliminary injunction and, if he or
she does not do so, the court shall dissolve the temporary restraining order.
On two days' notice to the party who obtained the temporary restraining
order without notice or on such shorter notice to that party as the court may
prescribe, the adverse party may appear and move its dissolution or modi-
fication and in that event the court shall proceed to hear and determine such
motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice require.
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth
the reasons for its entry issuanee, shall be specific in terms; shall describe in
reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document,
the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties
to the action, their officers, agents, employees, and attorneys, and upon those
persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice
of the order by personal service or otherwise.
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
The above Act became law by Pub. Act No. 84-554, effective Sept. 18,
1985.
R. Section 11-102: Temporary Restraining
Orders and Preliminary Injunctions
Prior to 1967, Illinois provided only one form of injunctive relief before
a decision on the merits- "preliminary injunction." This injunction remained
in effect indefinitely "until the further order of the court." In 1967, the leg-
islature substantially amended the Illinois Injunction Act'53 and patterned the
amendment after the prevailing practice in the United States District Courts.
This amendment provided Illinois with two possible forms of injunctive relief
prior to a decision on the merits: a temporary restraining order, which re-
mains in effect for ten days only unless expressly extended by the court for
another ten days, and a preliminary injunction, which remains in effect in-
definitely "until the further order of the court."
In Kaplan v. Kaplan,' 4 the appellate court stated:
153. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, §§ 1-27 (1967) (repealed by Pub. Act 82-280, Article XIX-b,
1981 III. Laws 1382, 1625, 1628. Now codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 11-101 to I1-110
(1983)).
154. 98 III. App. 3d 136, 423 N.E.2d 1253 (lst Dist. 1980).
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Since the amendment to the Injunction Act in 1967, only two types of in-
junctive relief may be entered prior to the resolution of the controversy on
its merits; such injunctions are a temporary restraining order (I11. Rev. Stat.
1979, ch. 69, par. 3-1), and a preliminary injunction (I11. Rev. Stat. 1979,
ch. 69, par. 3). (See also Paddington Corp. v. Foremost Sales Promotions,
Inc. (1973), 13 Iil. App. 3d 170, 300 N.E.2d 484.) In this instance, while
the injunctive relief granted has been labeled a preliminary injunction, it
is more in the nature of a temporary restraining order, as we should look
to substance rather than form. (Bohn Aluminum & Brass Co. v. Barker
(1973), 55 I11. 2d 177, 303 N.E.2d 1.) The practical effect, however, of a
temporary restraining order issued with notice is the same as a preliminary
injunction issued with notice. A temporary restraining order issued with
notice and a preliminary injuction issued with notice, neither of limited du-
ration, are the same type of relief and both require the showing of the li-
kelihood of ultimate success on the merits. The statutorily imposed 10-day
duration on temporary restraining orders is not needed where there has been
notice to opposing parties. (Kable Printing Co. v. Mount Morris Book-
binder Union Local No. 65-B (1976), 63 111. 2d 514, 524, 349 N.E.2d 36.)
The temporary restraining order and the preliminary injunction both serve
the purpose of maintaining the status quo until the trial court can consider
the case on the merits. See S & F Corp. v. American Express Co. (1978),
60 I11. App. 3d 824, 377 N.E.2d 73; Board of Education v. Springfield Ed-
ucation Association (1977), 47 I11. App. 3d 193, 361 N.E.2d 697.'11
Due to an oversight in the drafting of the 1967 amendment, the previous
statutory provision for obtaining a preliminary injunction without notice was
left in the Injunction Act. This oversight in the Injunction Act permitted a
party to obtain a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction
without notice. This situation is illogical and disharmonious.
In Seagrams Distillers Co. v. Foremost Sales Promotions, Inc., 5 6 and Pad-
dington Corp. v. Foremost Sales Promotions, Inc.,'" the appellate court held
that the provision for obtaining injunctive relief without notice applied only
to temporary restraining orders, and not to preliminary injunctions. In Kable
Printing Co. v. Mount Morris Bookbinders Union,' the Illinois Supreme
Court explained that:
A preliminary injunction under section 3 may be granted with or without
notice, and if the latter, with a showing of 'immediate and irreparable in-
jury.' Additionally, the movant must establish the likelihood of ultimate
success on the merits of the case. (Frenchik v. Dean, 62 111. 2d 231, 241;
Wessel Co. v. Busa, 28 I11. App. 3d 686, 690.) Under section 3-1 a tem-
porary restraining order may also be granted with or without notice, and
if the latter, with a showing of 'immediate and irreparable injury.' More-
over, a temporary restraining order issued without notice, unlike a cor-
responding preliminary injunction, is limited in duration unless specifically
extended for 10 days upon showing a good cause or for a longer period
155. Id. at 140, 423 N.E.2d at 1256.
156. 13 Ill. App. 3d 166, 300 N.E.2d 490 (Ist Dist. 1973).
157. 13 111. App. 3d 170, 300 N.E.2d 484 (lst Dist. 1973).
158. 63 II1. 2d 514, 349 N.E.2d 36 (1976).
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upon the consent of the adverse party. It is apparent from a consideration
of these two sections that a temporary restraining order issued with notice
is, in its practical results, no different than a preliminary injunction issued
with notice. The only difference between the two is that the latter requires
the movant to show a probability of success on the merits. To permit such
a distinction is incongruous and obviously contrary to the legislature's in-
tention in creating a system of injunctive relief. Accordingly, we hold that
a temporary restraining order issued with notice and a preliminary in-
junction issued with notice, neither of limited duration, are the same type
of relief, and whether referred to under either term require a showing of
the likelihood of ultimate success on the merits of the case. The order pro-
vided it would 'remain in full force and effect pending further order of this
court,' and defendants cannot ignore what was clearly stated.,"
In Webb v. Rock,'60 the court said:
In Kable Printing Co. v. Mt. Morris Bookbinders Union Local, (1976), 63
Ill. 2d 514, 349 N.E.2d 36, the supreme court held that the 10-day limitation
periods of section 3-1 were not applicable to TRO's issued after proper no-
tice and that such orders could be ordered to continue until a decision on
the merits of the case was reached. The court noted the confusion resulting
from the retention of section 3 after the enactment of section 3-1 . . . .
In Jurco v. Stuart,162 the court said:
We believe the structure contemplated by sections 3 and 3-1 of the In-
junction Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 69, pars. 3, 3-1) is the three-tiered
system of injunctive relief similar to that practiced in the Federal court which
consists of temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and per-
manent injunctions. Kable Printing Co. v. Mount Morris Bookbinders Union
Local 65-B (1976), 63 Il. 2d 514, 520, 349 N.E.2d 36, 38; People ex rel.
Pollution Control Board v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. (1972), 4 Il. App.
3d 675, 281 N.E.2d 757; Paddington Corp. v. Foremost Sales Promotions,
Inc. (1973), 13 111. App. 3d 170, 300 N.E.2d 484; see Bohn Aluminum &
Brass Co. v. Barker (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 177, 186 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
The first proceeding is the temporary restraining order. A temporary re-
straining order is a drastic, emergency remedy which may issue only in ex-
ceptional circumstances and for a brief duration. (City of Chicago v. Airline
Canteen Service, Inc. (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 417, 380 N.E.2d 1106; Board
of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Union Local 1600 (1976), 42
Ill. App. 3d 1056, 356 N.E.2d 1089; Paddington Corp. v. Foremost Sales
Promotions, Inc. (1973), 13 IlI. App. 3d 170, 300 N.E.2d 484; see Hech-
inger, Requisites for the Issuance of a TRO and an Injunction in the Chan-
cery Division, 63 Chi. Bar Rec. 184 (1982).) The purpose of a temporary
restraining order is to maintain the status quo until a hearing can be had
on an application for a preliminary injunction. (People ex rel. Pollution
Control Board v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. (1972), 4 111. App. 3d 675, 281
159. Id. at 523, 524, 349 N.E.2d at 40.
160. 80 I1. App. 3d 891, 400 N.E.2d 959 (4th Dist. 1980).
161. Id. at 895, 400 N.E.2d at 963.
162. '10 Ill. App. 3d 405, 442 N.E.2d 633 (1st Dist. 1982).
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N.E.2d 757.) Whether the temporary restraining order is with or without
notice it is upon a summary showing of the necessity of the order to prevent
immediate and irreparable injury. (See Moore, Federal Practice par. 65.05
(2d ed.).) If the temporary restraining order is without notice, it is limited
to a period of 10 days with a possible exception as stated in the statute of
another 10 days under certain circumstances. (I11. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 69,
par. 3-1; Kable Printing Co. v. Mount Morris Bookbinders Union Local
65-B (1976), 63 II1. 2d 514, 349 N.E.2d 36.) If the temporary restraining
order is issued with notice the 10-day time limit does not apply. 63 Iil. 2d
514, 521, 349 N.E.2d 36, 39; Lawter International, Inc. v. Carroll (1982),
107 I11. App. 3d 938, 438 N.E.2d 590.
The problem arises in cases such as the one at bar where there has been
a summary proceeding with notice and a temporary restraining order is is-
sued but no hearing date is set. The effect then is to have an order with
significant consequences extant with only a limited opportunity on the part
of a party to resist such an order. To allow a temporary restraining order
of unlimited duration is to have a preliminary injunction (Kable Printing
Co. v. Mount Morris Bookbinders Union Local 65-B (1976), 63 111. 2d 514,
349 N.E.2d 36) without giving the one party a fair opportunity to oppose
the application and to show if he can why an injunction should not issue.
(See Moore, Federal Practice par. 65.04[3] (2d ed.).) A preliminary in-
junction then maintains the status quo during the pendency of a trial on
the merits. People ex rel. Pollution Control Board v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing
Co. (1972), 4 I1. App. 3d 675, 281 N.E.2d 757.
A defendant should be allowed to present evidence and legal argument.
(Paddington Corp. v. Foremost Sales Promotions, Inc. (1973), 13 Ill. App.
3d 170, 300 N.E.2d 484.) Oral argument is not proper evidence. People ex
rel. Scott v. Aluminum Coil Anodizing Corp. (1971), 132 I1. App. 2d 168,
268 N.E.2d 53.
Because of the evidentiary hearing requirement for a preliminary in-
junction, we do not believe that the instant order emanating from a sum-
mary proceeding, albeit with notice, for an unspecified duration is within
the statutory scheme envisioned by the legislature. Although a temporary
restraining order with notice may exist beyond 10 days, the hearing must
be set within a short time thereafter so as to prevent the potential significant
consequences of only a summary proceeding to exist more than a short pe-
riod of time. We have held that a temporary restraining order with notice
which is to exist beyond the 10-day period is a proper order where the hear-
ing on the preliminary injunction is scheduled immediately following the
expiration of a 10-day order. (Lawter International, Inc. v. Carroll (1982),
107 Il1. App. 3d 938, 438 N.E.2d 590.) This holding comports with the ra-
tionale that a temporary restraining order is an emergency proceeding to
maintain the status quo until a hearing can be held on the preliminary in-
junction. (People ex rel. Pollution Control Board v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing
Co. (1972), 4 11. App. 3d 675, 281 N.E.2d 757.) A hearing on a preliminary
injunction that is delayed for more than a short period of time, or as in
this case, a hearing at an unspecified date in the not immediately foresee-
able future, does not comport with the statutory scheme.' 6
163. Id. at 408, 442 N.E.2d at 636.
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Article VI, section 17 of the Illinois Constitution requires that: "The Su-
preme Court shall provide by rule for an annual judicial conference to con-
sider the work of the courts and to suggest improvements in the administration
of justice'and shall report thereon annually in writing to the General Assem-
bly not later than January 31."' 64 On January 31, 1984, the Illinois Supreme
Court sent the following message to the Illinois Legislature:
THE STATUTE WHICH CONTINUES TO ALLOW A COURT TO
GRANT A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WITHOUT PREVIOUS
NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES SHOULD BE RE-EXAMINED
Prior to 1967 "An Act to revise the law in relation to injunction" (In-
junction Act) provided for injunctive relief with prior notice to the defend-
ant, and without prior notice where the plaintiff's rights would be "unduly
prejudiced" if the injunction were not "issued immediately." (111. Rev. Stat.
1965, ch. 69, par. 3.) In 1967 the Injunction Act was amended by the ad-
dition of a new section providing for temporary restraining orders (TRO)
without notice (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 69, par. 3-1) and by some language
modifications in section 3, including denomination of the relief therein as
a preliminary injunction (I11. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 69, par. 3). However,
section 3 retained the verbiage concerning the granting of injunctive relief
both with and without notice. The amended sections were subsequently in-
corporated into the Code of Civil Procedure, former section 3-1 of the In-
junction Act (TROs) being designated as section 11-101 of the Code and
former section 3 (preliminary injunctions) being designated as section 11-
102. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1982 Supp., ch. 110, cars. 11-101, 11-102.) Accordingly,
under the present statutory scheme, upon a showing that "immediate and
irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the applicant," either a
TRO without notice or a preliminary injunction without notice may issue.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1982 Supp., ch. 110, pars. 11-101, 11-102.
This dual system of allowing injunctive relief in essentially the same cir-
cumstances has caused some confusion among the bench and bar. The Il-
linois Appellate Court has recently stated, in an effort to clarify the statutory
scheme for the injunctive relief, that:
We believe the structure contemplated by [sections 11-101 and 11-1021 is
the three-tiered system of injunctive relief similar to that practiced in the
Federal court which consists of [TROs], preliminary injunctions and per-
manent injunctions. [Citations.] The first proceeding is the [TRO]. A [TRO]
is a drastic, emergency remedy which may issue only in exceptional cir-
cumstances and for a brief duration. [Citations.] The purpose of a [TRO]
is to maintain the status quo until a hearing can be had on an application
for a preliminary injunction .... (Jurco v. Stuart (1982), 110 111. App. 3d
405, 408.)
Too, one commentator has expressed the view, which is shared by many,
that "in the drafting of the 1967 [TRO] amendment, the previous statutory
provision for obtaining a preliminary injunction without notice was not
164. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 17.
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removed from the Injunction Act. This resulted in the Injunction Act pro-
viding for the obtaining of a [TRO] or a preliminary injunction without
notice-an illogical and inharmonious situation. * * * [Section 11-102] is
in need of correction to bring harmony out of chaos and to make the dis-
tinction between a [TRO] and a preliminary injunction meaningful." Fins,
Guide to Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (1981), pp. 320, 321.
The Supreme Court suggests that the General Assembly consider clari-
fying the preliminary injunction statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1982 Supp., ch. 110,
par. 11-102) by eliminating that part of it which allows a court to grant a
preliminary injunction without notice so that there will be a clearer un-
derstanding between the bench and bar of those meaningful distinctions
between TROs and preliminary injunctions as intended by the General As-
sembly.6 1
5
To accomplish this objective, section 11-102 should be amended to read as
follows:
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend section 11-102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved
August 19, 1981, as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly:
Section 1. Section 11-102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved August
19, 1981, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 11-102)
Sec. 11-102. Preliminary injunction. No court or judge shall grant a pre-
liminary injunction without previous notice of the time and place of the ap-
plication having been given the adverse party unlces it clcarly appears, From
spccific faets shown by the verified complaint or by affidavit accompanying
the same that immediate and irreparable injury, less or damage will result to
the applicant beforce netiee can be served and a hearing had thereen.
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
The above Act became law by Pub. Act No. 84-682, effective Jan. 1, 1986.
S. Need for Repeal of Section 12-107
Section 12-107 of the Code reads as follows:
Section 12-107. Incarceration of judgment debtor. No order shall be en-
tered for the incarceration of a judgment debtor except when the judgment
is entered for a tort committed by such judgment debtor, and it appears
from a special finding of the jury, or from a special finding by the court,
if the case is tried by the court without a jury, that malice is the gist of
the action, and except when the judgment debtor refuses to deliver up his
or her estate for the benefit of his or her creditors.
165. The Illinois Supreme Court's message to the General Assembly in 1985 repeated the
request and again cited H. FINS, GUIDE TO ILLINOIS CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 320, 321 (1981).
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The Illinois Supreme Court in Lawyers Title of Phoenix v. Gerber,66
interpreted this section and held that two conditions must be present:
(1) a tort with a finding that malice is the gist of the action, and also
(2) a judgment debtor who refuses to deliver up his or her estate for the
benefit of creditors. 6 7
Section 12-301 of the Code reads as follows:
Section 12-301. Contempt for concealing property. Any person who
hides or conceals any property so that it cannot be taken by virtue of an
order or judgment, or, on the officer's request therefor, refuses to deliver
property to the officer having an order or judgment for the taking of the
property is guilty of contempt of court and subject to punishment therefor.
If the incarceration provision in section 12-107 is intended as punishment for
a crime, it is invalid because it fails to provide for a time-period of incar-
ceration.
Twenty-one American Jurisprudence 2d, says:
To constitute a crime, the act in question must ordinarily be one to which
is annexed, upon conviction, a certain specified punishment. And it has
been held that a statute declaring an act unlawful, but prescribing no pen-
alty, does not create a crime.
"Provision for imprisonment in a statute does not make an act or pro-
ceeding criminal in nature when applied, not as punishment, but to compel
immediate obedience to the law, as, for example, contempt proceedings.'61
However, if the provision is intended as punishment for civil contempt, it is
already covered by section 12-301 and is redundant. In either event, Section
12-107 should be repealed.
In this connection, it should be noted that section 12-107 is practically dead
because its foundation, The Insolvent Debtors Act, has been repealed. In 1872,
Illinois enacted "an Act concerning insolvent debtors." This Act was incor-
porated into the Code of Civil Procedure as Part 13 of Article XII and (with
other related sections) was repealed in 1983 by the passage of Public Act 83-
352. The legislature's failure to include section 12-107 in the repeal of 1983
was the result of a clerical omission which should be corrected immediately.
Furthermore, if a judgment debtor's refusal to deliver property to satisfy
an order or judgment in favor of a creditor would subject him to punishment
for contempt under Section 12-301, the requirement of section 12-107 that
the judgment be, in addition, in tort with a finding of malice as the basis for
166. 44 III. 2d 145, 254 N.E.2d 461 (1969).
167. Id. at 149, 150, 254 N.E.2d at 463 (emphasis added).
168. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 5 (1981).
[Vol. 34:859
19851 ILLINOIS CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 921
the action is superfluous, nonsensical, and extremely confusing. Therefore
section 12-107 should be repealed.
A bill to correct this situation is herewith submitted:
Proposed Bill
An Act to repeal Section 12-107 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved
August 19, 1981, as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the
General Assembly:
(ch. 110, rep. par. 12-107)
Section 1. Section 12-107 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved August
19, 1981, as amended, is repealed.
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
T. Addition of Code Section 14-110
Will Avoid Multiplicity of Actions
To avoid the possibility that a levy against the property of a municipal or
quasi-municipal corporation as a judgment debtor may result in the inability
of the municipal or quasi-municipal corporation to perform its public duties,
the cases and statutes have developed a rule that no writ of execution can
issue against such judgment debtor.' 69 Thus, the judgment creditor must file
an independent action for mandamus to enforce the judgment. This proce-
dure requires payment by the judgment creditor of a new filing fee to the clerk
of the court. The payment of new sheriff's fees for service of summons also
results in new delays. This circuity of action is totally unnecessary. Code sec-
tion 2-1402, entitled "Supplementary proceedings," fully protects the judg-
ment debtor by the express provision in proposed new Code section 14-110.
Specifically, whatever property was previously exempt from the enforcement
of a judgment under an action for mandamus still remains exempt.
Subsection (h) of Code section 2-1402 provides that:
(h) This Section does not grant the power to any court to order install-
ment or other payments from, or compel the sale, delivery, surrender, as-
signment or conveyance of any property exempt by statute from the
enforcement of a judgment thereon, a deduction order, garnishment, at-
tachment, sequestration, process or other levy or seizure.
To avoid the multiplicity of actions that occurs when judgments against
debtors are enforced, the following bill is herewith submitted:
169. See Moore v. Town of Browning, 373 Il1. 583, 27 N.E.2d 469 (1940); City of Olney v.
Harvey & Boyd, 50 Il1. 453 (1869); National Bank of Decatur v. City of Gibson, 261 Ill. App.
190 (3d Dist. 1931).
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Proposed Bill
An Act to add section 14-110 to the Code of Civil Procedure, approved
August 19, 1981, as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly:
Section 1. Section 14-110 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure, ap-
proved August 19, 1981. The added section is to read as follows:
(ch. 110, new par. 14-110)
Sec. 14-110. When mandamus not required. No action for mandamus is
necessary to enforce a judgment against a municipal or quasi-municipal cor-
poration and the relief heretofore available by an action for mandamus shall
hereafter be obtainable by the judgment creditor proceeding under Section
2-1402 of this Act in the case wherein the judgment was entered against the
municipal or quasi-municipal corporation. However, property of the judg-
ment debtor which was heretofore exempt from the enforcement of a judg-
ment therefrom shall remain so exempt.
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
U. Need to Repeal Ne Exeat
The writ of ne exeat was originally a high prerogative writ used at common
law either to prevent citizens in debt from leaving the country, or to aid the
sovereign in compelling citizens to pay taxes. 70 In modern times, relief by ne
exeat, while rarely used, has acted to forbid persons to whom it is addressed
to leave the country, the state, or the jurisdiction of the court.' 7 ,
Fifty-seven American Jurisprudence 2d, states:
In many of the American states the writ of ne exeat, seeming to be re-
pugnant to American institutions, has been abolished by statute, either ex-
pressly or by implication, although in a few jurisdictions it is still in force
and recognized by statutory enactment.' 2
During the last three decades, the Illinois reviewing courts have heard only
two ne exeat cases: Earles v. Earles'7 and Executive Commercial Services v.
Daskalakis.'4 In both cases the courts rejected the plaintiffs' requests for this
harsh remedy. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also reached the
170. See Brophy v. Sheppard, 124 Ill. App. 512, 516-17 (Ist Dist. 1906).
171. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, note 102, at 929-30.
172. 57 AM. JUR. 2D Ne Exeat § I (1971).
173. 343 Il. App. 447, 99 N.E.2d 359 (1st Dist. 1951).
174. 74 I1. App. 3d 760, 393 N.E.2d 1365 (2d Dist. 1979).
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same result in United States v. Shaheen, 75 While reviewing an Illinois case,
the Seventh Circuit explained that:
When issued, the writ restrains the right possessed by "every man [to]
go out of the realm for whatever cause he pleaseth." This right to travel
is "a constitutional liberty closely related to rights of free speech and as-
sociation. . . ." Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517, 84 S.Ct.
1659, 1669, 12 L.Ed. 2d 992.176
Similarly, in Dunn v. Blumstein, '71 the United States Supreme Court said
that "freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recog-
nized as a basic right under the Constitution."' 78
1. Parallel Between Capias Ad Respondendum and Ne Exeat
Prior to 1963, in an action at law a plaintiff could cause the arrest of the
defendant merely by filing an affidavit stating "facts showing that the defend-
ant fraudulently contracted the debt, or incurred the obligation, respecting
which the suit is about to be brought, or that he has concealed, assigned,
removed or disposed of his property with intent to defraud such plaintiff."'' 79
If the affidavit satisfied the court, the judge would issue a capias ad res-
pondendum, a warrant to arrest the defendant. This statute was repealed in
1963 10 and the pernicious capias ad respondendum has now vanished from
Illinois law. Ne exeat, however, also results in a restraint upon the defend-
ant's freedom of movement while providing creditors with a pressure tactic
for use against debtors. To date, ne exeat has not been repealed in Illinois.
Consistency in the treatment of judicial remedies dictates that ne exeat meet
the same fate as the former capias ad respondendum.
It should be noted that capias ad satisfaciendum, which is a warrant for
the imprisonment of a judgment debtor designed to force the debtor to satisfy
the judgment, was provided for in 1872 by the enactment of "AN ACT con-
cerning insolvent debtors."'' This Act was incorporated into the Code of
175. 445 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1971).
176. Id. at 10.
177. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
178. Id. at 338 (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966)). The Court also
cited the following cases in support of the right to travel: Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
283 (1849); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
168 (1869); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 285-86 (1970).
179. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16, § 1 (1961).
180. 1963 I1. Laws 3240.
181. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, §§ 34-73 (1872) (later codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 72, § I -
34 (1979)).
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Civil Procedure as Part 13 of Article XII but (together with other related sec-
tions) was repealed in 1983 by Public Act 83-352.82 Thus, the ancient "twin
sisters" of capias ad respondendum and capias ad satisfaciendum were ban-
ished from Illinois. Ne exeat deserves the same treatment.
2. Adequate Remedy Available in Code of Civil Procedure
If a creditor fears that a debtor will take property out of the state to avoid
satisfaction of a debt, the creditor's remedy is attachment. This remedy ap-
pears in Code section 4-101 and is available in the following situations:
4. Where the debtor is about to depart from this State with the intention
of having his or her effects removed from this State.
5. Where the debtor is about to remove his or her property from this State
to the injury of such creditor.
A plaintiff's bond is required in attachment" 3 as well as in ne exeat.8 4 A
plaintiff who chooses ne exeat instead of attachment does so to annoy the
debtor by interfering with the debtor's personal liberty.
In this connection, it should be noted that Code section 2-1402 entitled
"Supplementary proceedings" provides a creditor with multiple remedies to
enforce a judgment. Illinois citizens who possess a sense of decency in their
conduct as members of society should not object to the disappearance of ne
exeat from the Illinois legal scene.
Code section 16-101 should therefore be amended to state: "Relief by ne
exeat republica is abolished", and the remaining 10 sections of Article XVI
of the Code should be repealed. A bill to accomplish this objective is herewith
submitted:
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend Section 16-101 and to repeal Sections 16-102 through 16-
111 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved August 19, 1981, as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State for Illinois, represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly:
Section 1. Section 16-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved August
19, 1981, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 16-101)
Sec. 16-101. Ne exeat abolished. Availability of rcmedy. Relief by ne exeat
182. Pub. Act. No. 83-352, § 2, 1983 111. Laws 2813, 2814.
183. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 4-107 (1983).
184. Id. at §§ 16-104, 16-107 (1983).
[Vol. 34:859
1985] ILLINOIS CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 925
republica imay be granted, in cascs where the debt or claim is not actually
due, but exists fairly and bona fide in cxpcctancy at the timc of making ap
plication, and in eases whcrc the claimt is due, and it is net ncccssary, to au
tnerltz the granting 31 such relvf by ne c.cat, that the applicant ovw that.
his or her debt of claim is purly of an equitable charaeter is abolished.
(ch. 110, rep. pars. 16-102 through 16-111)
Section 2. Sections 16-102, 16-103, 16-104, 16-105, 16-106, 16-107, 16-108,
16-109, 16-110, and 16-111 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved August
19, 1981, as amended, are repealed.
Section 3. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
V. Service of Process in Attachment and
Replevin Must be Coordinated by Statute
Section 26 of "AN ACT relating to the circuit courts"' 5 provides:
The respective courts and the several judges thereof shall have the power
to award throughout the state, and returnable in the proper county, relief
by injunction, ne exeat, habeas corpus, quo warranto, and all other
processes that may be necessary to the due execution of the powers with
which they are or may be vested. '
Code section 2-202(b) (former section 13.1(2) of the Civil Practice Act) pro-
vides that: "Summons may be served upon the defendants, wherever they
may be found in the State, by any person authorized to serve process."
1. Attachment
Code section 4-112 provides:
Sec. 4-112. Serving of order. Such officer shall without delay serve the or-
der for attachment upon the property described in the order, or in the ab-
sence of such description, upon the lands, tenements, goods, chattels, rights,
credits, moneys and effects of the debtor, or upon any lands and tenements
in and to which such debtor has or may claim any equitable interest or title,
of sufficient value to satisfy the claim sworn to, with costs of the action.
Except as provided in section 4-116 of this Act, the order for attachment
may be levied only in the county in which the order is entered, and by
a proper officer of that county.
Code section 4-118 provides:
Sec. 4-118. Certified copies of order to other county. The creditor may, at
the same time, or at any time before judgment, cause a certified copy of
an order for attachment to be issued to any other county in the State where
the debtor may have property liable to be attached, which shall be levied
as other certified copies of orders for attachment.
The second paragraph of section 4-112 renders section 4-118 meaningless. The
second paragraph of section 4-112 should therefore be deleted.
185. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 72.26 (1983).
186. Id. (emphasis added).
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2. Replevin
Section 19-109 of the Code (former section 7 of the Replevin Act)'8 pro-
vides that: "The order for replevin may be served as a summons . . . by any
person authorized to serve summons." Code section 19-110 (former section
8 of the Replevin Act) provides: "Additional certified copies of the order for
replevin may be issued by the clerk of court, upon the request of the plaintiff,
to be used in several counties."
Code section 19-116 (former section 14 of the Replevin Act) is in apparent
conflict with the above provisions. In the second paragraph, the section pro-
vides that:
The order for replevin issued as provided in Section 19-108 of this Act, may
be served as a summons upon defendants wherever they may be found in
the State by any person authorized to serve summons in other civil cases;
but property may be taken from the possession of a defendant under a re-
plevin order only in the county in which the order is entered and by a proper
officer of the county."'
Thus, section 19-110 which expressly provides .that orders for replevin may
be used in several counties, and section 19-116 which limits the use of a re-
plevin order only to the county in which the order is entered are hopelessly
irreconcilable.
A bill to amend sections 4-112 and 19-116 of the Code is herewith sub-
mitted:
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend sections 4-112 and 19-116 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
approved August 19, 1981, as amended, is amended as follows:
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly:
Section 1. Section 4-112 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved August
19, 1981, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 4-112)
Sec. 4-112. Serving of order. Such officer shall without delay serve the or-
der for attachment upon the property described in the order, or in the absence
of such description, upon the lands, tenements, goods, chattels, rights, cred-
its, moneys and effects of the debtor, or upon any lands and tenements in
and to which such debtor has or may claim any equitable interest or title, of
sufficient value to satisfy the claim sworn to, with costs of the action.
Emxpt as provided in ,tion 4 116 of this At , th ordr for attachmet.
may be levied only in the county in which the order is entercd, and by a proper
offieer of that county.
Section 2. Section 19-116 of the Code of Civil Procedure, approved August
19, 1981, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 19-116)
187. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 119, §§ 1-28 (1979).
188. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 19-116 (1983) (emphasis added).
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Sec. 19-116. Service of order. Upon the bond being given the sheriff or
other proper officer shall forthwith serve the certified copy of the order by
seizing the property therein mentioned and by serving such order upon the
defendant as summons is served in other civil cases.
The order for replevin issued as provided in Section 19-108 of this Act, may
be served as a summons upon the defendants wherever they may be found
in the State by any person authorized to serve summons in other civil cases;
and bttt property may be taken from the possession of a defendant under a
replevin order eny in any the county where it is found in which thc order
............. ~ by a proper officer of the county.
The officer serving such certified order having taken the property or any
part thereof shall forthwith deliver such property to the plaintiff unless the
defendant executes a bond and security approved by such officer, before such
property is actually delivered to the plaintiff. Such bond shall be given in an
amount double the value of such property and conditioned that the defendant
will appear in and defend the action, and will deliver such property in ac-
cordance with the order of the court, in as good condition as it was when
the action was commenced, and that the defendant will pay only those costs
and damages that may be incurred during the time the property is out of the
possession of the officer and back in his or her possession and adjudged against
the defendant in such action.
Such bond shall, on the day such order is returnable, be returned to the
court by the officer serving the order. on the day suh.od r is r trnabl
Section 3. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
W. Need to Coordinate Terminology in Code
of Civil Procedure with Terminology of
Illinois Constitution of 1970 and a
Number of Illinois Modernized Statutes
At common law, the phrase "lands, tenements or hereditaments" was fre-
quently employed to designate "real property" or "real estate." However,
since the latter part of the nineteenth century, the use of the common law
phrase has been gradually abandoned in Illinois.5 9
189. For example:
1. "AN ACT concerning land titles," enacted in 1897 (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 45-148
(1983)), does not employ "lands, tenements or hereditaments".
2. The Mechanic's Liens Act (which deals with liens upon real estate), enacted in 1903
(ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, §§ 1-39 (1983)), does not employ "lands, tenements or hereditaments".
3. The Revenue Act of 1939 (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 482-811 (1983)), does not employ
"lands, tenements or hereditaments".
4. The Condominium Property Act, enacted in 1963 ( ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 30, §§ 301-331
(1983)), does not employ "lands, tenements or hereditaments".
5. The Land Sales Act, enacted in 1969 (ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 30, §§ 371-389 (1983)), does
not employ "lands, tenements or hereditaments".
6. The Illinois Income Tax Act, enacted in 1969, which provides for foreclosures of tax
liens on real property (ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 1-101 to 17-1701 (1983)) does not employ
19851
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Due to an oversight in the process of codification, however, the phrase
"lands, tenements or hereditaments," which was present in old statutes that
were transferred into the Code, has remained in a number of sections of the
Code of Civil Procedure. This oversight needs correction.
A bill to delete the common law terminology for real property from various
Code sections is herewith submitted:
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend sections 4-112, 5-125, 6-102, 6-103, 9-101, 9-102, 9-104.1,
9-202, 9-215, 12-106, 12-112, 13-107, 13-109, 13-111 and 17-101 of the Code
of Civil Procedure in order to coordinate terminology with the Illinois Con-
stitution of 1970 and a number of other Illinois Statutes.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly:
Section 1. Sections 4-112, 5-125, 6-102, 6-103, 9-101, 9-102, 9-104.1, 9-202,
9-215, 12-106, 12-112, 13-107, 13-109, 13-111 and 17-101 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, approved August 19, 1981, as amended, are amended to read as
follows:
(Ch. 110, par. 4-112)
Sec. 4-112. Serving of order. Such officer shall without delay serve the or-
der for attachment upon the property described in the order, or in the absence
of such description, upon the real property lands, fcncmcnts, goods, chattels,
rights, credits, moneys and effects of the debtor, or upon any real property
lands, tcncmcnt, in and to which such debtor has or may claim any equitable
7. Section 4 of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, provides:
§ 4. Real Property Taxation
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Section, taxes upon real property shall
be levied uniformly by valuation ascertained as the General Assembly shall provide
by law.
(b) Subject to such limitations as the General Assembly may hereafter prescribe
by law, counties with a population of more than 200,000 may classify or to continue
to classify real property for purposes of taxation. Any such classification shall be
reasonable and assessments shall be uniform within each class. The level of assess-
ment or rate of tax of the highest class in a county shall not exceed two and one-
half times the level of assessment or rate of tax of the lowest class in that county.
Real property used in farming in a county shall not be assessed at a higher level
of assessment than single family residential real property in that county.
(c) Any depreciation in the value of real estate occasioned by a public easement
may be deducted in assessing such property.
ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4 (emphasis added). The phrase "lands, tenements or hereditaments"
was omitted.
8. The Probate Act of 1975 (ILL. REV. STAT. ch 110-1/2, §§ I-I to 27-1 (1983)), does not
employ "lands, tenements or hereditaments".
9. The Conservation Rights in Real Property Act, enacted in 1975 (ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
30, §§ 401-406 (1983)), does not employ "lands, tenements or hereditaments".
10. Article XV of the Code of Civil Procedure, entitled "Mortgage Foreclosure", enacted
in 1981 (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 15-101 to 15-311 (1983)) does not employ "lands, tenements
or hereditaments".
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interests or title, of sufficient value to satisfy the claim sworn to, with costs
of the action.
Except as provided in Section 4-116 of this Act, the order for attachment
may be levied only in the county in which the order is entered, and by a proper
officer of that county.
(ch. 110, par. 5-125)
Sec. 5-125. Enforcement of fee bill. In all cases where either party is ad-
judged to pay costs before final judgment, by reason of setting aside a vol-
untary dismissal, a dismissal for want of prosecution or a default, or the
granting of a continuance or new trial, or otherwise, and in all cases where
there is security for costs, or attorney liable for costs, or an action brought
for to the use of anotner, and the plaintiff is adjudged to pay the costs, either
before or upon final judgement, it shall be lawful for the clerk to prepare
and tax a bill of costs so adjudged to be paid, against the party adjudged to
pay the same, and against his or her security for costs, or other person liable
for the payment thereof, or either of them, and certify the same under the
seal of the court, which being delivered to the sheriff of the proper county,
the sheriff shall demand payment from the person therein charged; if payment
is not made accordingly, within 30 days after such demand, the sheriff shall
levy the same on the personal and real property goods and hatt.ls, lands and
tenements of the person so chargeable, and proceed therein in the same man-
ner as judgments for the payment of money are enforced.
(ch. 110, par. 6-102)
Sec. 6-102. Interest in land. It may also be brought to recover realproperty
lands, tenements .r her.ditam.nts, and by any person claiming an estate
therein, in fee for life or for years, whether as heir, legatee or purchaser.
(ch. 110, par. 6-103)
Sec. 6-103. Lessee of United States or of this State. In all cases in which
any person has heretofore entered upon and occupied or shall hereafter enter
upon and occupy, any real property lands, tenements or her^ditaments within
this State, by virtue of any lease or permit from the United States or this
State, such person, his, her or their legatees, executors, administrators, heirs
or assigns, may have and maintain an action of ejectment against any person
who has or may enter upon such real property lands, tenements or hredi
taments without the consent of such lessee, his, her or their legatees, exec-
utors, administrators, heirs or assigns, and proof of the right of possession
shall be sufficient to authorize a recovery.
(ch. 110, par. 9-101)
Sec. 9-101. Forcible entry prohibited. No person shall enter upon real prop-
erty make an entry into lands or tenements except in cases where entry is al-
lowed by law, and in such cases he or she shall not enter with force, but in
a peaceable manner.
(ch. 110, par. 9-102)
Sec. 9-102. (a) when action may be maintained. The person entitled to the
possession of realproperty lands or tenements may be restored thereto in the
manner hereafter provided:
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1. When a forcible entry is made thereon.
2. When a peaceable entry is made and the possession unlawfully withheld.
3. When entry is made into vacant or unoccupied real property lands-or
tenements without right or title.
4. When any lessee of the real property lands or tenements, or any person
holding under such lessee, retains holds posseession without right after the
termination of the lease or tenancy by its own limitation, condition or terms,
or by notice to quit or otherwise.
5. When a vendee having obtained possession under a written or verbal
agreement to purchase real property lands or tenements, and having failed
to comply with the agreement, withholds possession thereof, after demand
in writing by the person entitled to such possession.
6. When real property has lands or tencmcnts have been conveyed by a aoy
grantor in possession, or sold under the order or judgment of any court in
this State, or by virtue of any sale in any mortage or deed of trust contained
and the grantor in possession or party to such order or judgment or to such
mortgage or deed of trust, after the expiration of the time of redemption,
when redemption is allowed by law, refuses or neglects to surrender posses-
sion thereof, after demand in writing by the person entitled thereto, or his
or her agent.
7. When any property is subject to the provisions of the "Condominium
Property Act", approved June 20, 1963, as amended, the owner of a unit
fails or refuses to pay when due his or her proportionate share of the common
expenses of such property, or of any other expenses lawfully agreed upon or
any unpaid fine, the Board of Managers or its agents have served the demand
set forth in Section 9-104.1 of this Act Artiele in the manner provided for
in that Section and the unit owner has failed to pay the amount claimed within
the time prescribed in the demand.
8. When any property is subject to the provisions of a declaration estab-
lishing a common interest community and requiring the unit owner to pay
regular or special assessments for the maintenance or repair of common areas
owned in common by all of the owners of the common interest community
or by the community association and maintained for the use of the unit own-
ers or of any other expenses of the association lawfully agreed upon, and the
unit owner fails or refuses to pay when due his or her proportionate share
of such assessments or expenses and the board or its agents have served the
demand set forth in Section 9-104.1 of this Act Artiele in the manner provided
for in that Section and the unit owner has failed to pay the amount claimed
within the time prescribed in the demand.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (8) of subsection (a) of Section 9-102 and
Section 9-104.3 of this Act shall not apply to any common interest community
unless (1) the association is a not-for-profit corporation, (2) unit owners are
authorized to attend meetings of the board of directors or board of managers
of the association in the same manner as provided for condominiums under
the Condominium Property Act, and (3) the board of managers or board of
directors of the common interest community association has, subsequent to
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the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1984 voted to have the provisions
of this Article apply to such association and has delivered or mailed notice
of such action to the unit owners.
(c) For purposes of this Act Atiele, (1) "Common Interest Community"
means real estate other than a condominium or cooperative with respect to
which any person by virtue of his or her ownership of a partial interest or
unit therein is obligated to pay for maintenance, improvement, insurance pre-
miums, or real estate taxes of other real estate described in a declaration which
is adminstered by an association; (2) "Declaration" means any duly recorded
instruments, however designated, that have created a common interest com-
munity and any duly recorded amendments to those instruments; (3) "Unit"
means a physical portion of the common interest community designated by
separate ownership or occupancy by boundaries which are described in a dec-
laration; and, (4) "Unit Owners' Association" or "Association" means the
association of all owners of units in the common interest community acting
pursuant to the declaration.
(ch. 110, par. 9-104.1)
Sec. 9-104.1. Demand-Notice-Return-Condominium and Contract
Purchasers. (a) In case there is a contract for the purchase of such real prop-
erty lands or tenements or in case of condominium property, the demand shall
give the purchaser under such contract, or to the condominium unit owner,
as the case may be, at least 30 days to satisfy jhe terms of the demand before
an action is filed. In case of a condominium unit, the demand shall set forth
the amount claimed which must be paid within the time prescribed in the de-
mand and the time period or periods when the amounts were originally due.
The demand shall be signed by the person claiming such possession, his or
her agent, or attorney.
(b) The demand set forth in subsection (a) of this Section shall be served
either personally upon such purchaser or condominium unit owner by sending
the demand thereof by registered or certified mail with return receipt re-
quested to the last known address of such purchaser or condominium unit
owner or in case no one is in the actual possession of the premises, then by
posting the same on the premises. When such demand is made by an officer
authorized to serve process, his or her return is prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated and if such demand is made by any person not an officer,
the return may be sworn to by the person serving the same, and is then prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. No other demand shall be required
as a prerequisite to filing an action under paragraph (7) of Section 9-102 of
this Act Code.
(ch. 110, par. 9-202)
Sec. 9-202. Wilfully holding over. If any tenant or any person who is in
or comes into possession of any real property lands, tenements or h^redi
taments, by, from or under, or by collision with the tenant, wilfully holds
over any real property lands, tcncments or hrditamcnts, after the expiration
of his or her term or terms, and after demand made in writing, for the pos-
session thereof, by his or her landlord, or the person to whom the remainder
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or reversion of such real property lands, tenements or hr:dita.nts belongs,
the person so holding over, shall, for the time the landlord or rightful owner
is so kept out of possession, pay to the person so kept out of possession, or
his or her legal representatives, at the rate of double the yearly value of the
real property lands, tenements or herditamnts so detained to be recovered
by a civil action.
(ch. 110, par. 9-215)
Sec. 9-215. Remedies available to grantee. The grantees of any leased real
property lands, tencmns, rents or other herditamnts, or of the reversion
thereof, the assignees of the lessor of any lease, and the heirs, legatees and
personal representatives of the lessor, grantee or assignee, shall have the same
remedies by action or otherwise, for the non-performance of any agreement
in the lease, or for the recovery of any rent, or for the doing of any waste
or other cause of forfeiture, as their grantor or lessor might have had if such
reversion had remained in such lessor or grantor.
(ch. 110, par. 12-106)
Sec. 12-106. Enforcement in other counties. The person in whose favor
any judgment is entered, may have the judgment enforced by the proper
officer of any county, in this State, against the real and personal prop-
erty lands and tenements, goods and hattls of the person against whom
the judgment is entered ,or against his or her body, when the m i
authorized by l.w. Upon the filing in the office of the clerk of any
circuit court in any county in this State of a transcript of a judgment
entered in any other county of this State, enforcement may be had thereon
in that county, in like manner as in the county where originally entered.
(ch. 110, par. 12-112)
Sec. 12-112. What liable to enforcement. All the real and personal
property lands, tenements, r.al estate, goods and .hattls. (except such as
is by law declared to be exempt) of every person against whom any
judgment has been or shall be hereafter entered in any court, for any
debt, damages, costs, or other sum of money, shall be liable to be sold
to satisfy upon such judgment.
(ch. 110, par. 13-107)
Sec. 13-107. Seven years with possession and record title. Actions
brought for the recovery of any real property lands, tcncmcnts or here
di...nts of which any person may be possessed by actual residence
thereon for 7 successive years, having a connected title, deducible de-
dueti-ie of record, from this State or the United States, or from any
public officer or other person authorized by the laws of this State to sell
such real property land for the non-payment of taxes, or from any sher-
iff, marshall, or other person authorized to sell such land for the en-
forcement of a judgment or under any order or judgment of any court
shall be brought within 7 years next after possession is taken, but when
the possessor acquires such title after taking such possession, the limita-
tion shall begin to run from the time of acquiring title.
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(ch. 110, par. 13-109)
Sec. 13-109. Payment of taxes with color of title. Every person in the
actual possession of real property lands or tenements, under claim and
color of title, made in good faith, and who for 7 successive years, con-
tinue in such possession, and also, during such time, pays all taxes le-
gally assessed on such real property lands or tcnccnts, shall be held
and adjudged to be the legal owner of such real property lands o fene-
menrs, to the extent and according to the purport of his or her paper
title. All persons holding under such possession, by purchase, legacy or
descent, before such 7 years have expired, and who shall continue such
possession, and continue to pay the taxes as above set forth so as to
complete the possession and payment of taxes for the term above set
forth is entitled to the benefit of this Section.
(ch. 110, par. 13-111)
Sec. 13-111. State and United States. Sections 13-109 and 13-110 of
this Act shall not extend to real property lands or tcncmcnts owned by
the United States or of this State, nor to school and seminary lands, nor
to lands held for the use of religious societies, nor to lands held for any
public purpose. Nor shall they extend to real property lands or tenn. ts
when there is an adverse title to such real property lands or tcncmcnts,
and the holder of such adverse title is a minor, person under legal disa-
bility, imprisoned, out of the limits of the United States, or and in the
employment of the United States or of this State. Such person shall
commence an action to recover such real property lands or tenements so
possessed, as above set out, within 3 years after the several disabilities
herein enumerated cease to exist, and shall prosecute such action to judg-
ment, or in case of vacant and unoccupied land, shall, within the time
last set out, pay to the person or persons who have paid the same, all
the taxes, with interest thereon, at the rate of 12% per annum, that have
been paid on such vacant and unimproved land.
The exceptions provided in this Section shall not apply to the provi-
sions of Sections 13-118 through 13-121 of this Act.
(ch. 110, par. 17-101)
Sec. 17-101. Compelling partition. When real property is ads, tene
.. nts, or hrdita.nt are held in joint tenancy or tenancy in common,
whether such right or title is derived by purchase, legacy or descent, or
whether any or all of the claimants are minors or adults, any one or
more of the persons interested therein may compel a partition thereof by
a verified complaint in the circuit court of the county where the premises
or part of the premises are situated. If real property lands, tenements,
or hcrcditamcnts held in joint tenancy or tenancy in common are situated
in 2 or more counties, the venue may be in any one of such counties,
and circuit court of any such county first acquiring jurisdiction shall
retain sole and exclusive jurisdiction.
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
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X. Fourteen Code Sections
Require Stylistic Uniformity
1. Lack of Section Headings
The Code of Civil Procedure was approved on August 19, 1981. Each of
the more than 800 Code sections was provided with a legislative section head-
ing.
The Illinois 83d General Assembly added seventeen new sections to the Code.
Eleven of these sections have legislative section headings, and seven do not
have headings. The following seven sections should be amended to correct this
lack of uniformity: 2-209.1, 2-416, 9-104.1, 9-104.3, 9-316.1, 12-819, and 15-
102.1.
2. Numbering of Sections
Two of the new 1983 sections need stylistic coordination of section num-
bers. Throughout the Code, additional sections are indicated by the use of the
previous section number followed by a decimal and a digit.'1° For stylistic
uniformity throughout the Code, section "13-203a" should be corrected to
read "13-203.1," and section "13-214a" should be corrected to read "13-
214.1." Correcting these two sections will set a pattern and encourage stylistic
uniformity in the future.
3. Lettering of Subsections
Unlike all other sections of the Code, the five subsections of section 9-316.1
are numbered instead of lettered. Uniformity requires correction.
4. Gender references
Two of the 1983 sections need stylistic coordination with the rest of the
Code to make the Code gender-neutral. Therefore, in sections 9-213.1 and 13-
214a, the phrase "or her" should be inserted after the word "his."
5. References to Act
Two new sections, 9-106.1 and 9-104.1, added in 1983 refer to "paragraph
(7) of Section 9-102 of this Article." For complete stylistic uniformity
throughout the Code, the word "Article" should be substituted.with "Act".
6. Incorrect terminology
Section 2-1402 (derived from former section 73 of the Civil Practice Act)
complements Supreme Court Rule 277. Both the section and the rule are en-
190. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 2-205.1, 2-1105.1, 8-802.1, 9-104.1, 9-104.2, 9-106.1,
9-213.1, 15-102.1 (1983).
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titled "Supplementary Proceedings." This term appears in both section 2-1402
and in rule 277 many times. In the third sentence of subsection (a) of Section
2-1402, however, the term "supplemental proceedings" appears. This is a re-
sult of a typographical error made in 1955 when section 73 of the Civil Prac-
tice Act was substantially amended.' 9' This error has not yet been corrected.
Therefore, the term "supplemental" should be substituted with "supplemen-
tary".
7. Omission of Words
The word "or" should be inserted in section 6-137. Section 6-137 was de-
rived from Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 45, § 48 (1979) and the error in omitting the
word "or" occurred in 1977.192 The corrected section should read as follows:
Sec. 6-137. Issue of fact on petition. If any issue of fact is presented on
such petition, it shall be tried as in other civil cases; and if such issue is
found for the plaintiff, or if demand for trial by jury has been made in
accordance with law, a jury may assess damages in the amount of the mesne
profits received by the defendant since he or she entered into possession of
the premises, subject to the restrictions contained in Article VI of this Act.
8. Correction of a Word
Section 2-621(b)(3) contains the word "amendable" but should read "ame-
nable."
A bill to create stylistic uniformity among the foregoing sections is herewith
submitted:
Proposed Bill
An Act to amend the Code of Civil Procedure approved August 19, 1981,
as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly:
Section 1. Sections 2-209.1, 2-416, 2-621, 2-1402, 6-137, 9-104.1, 9-104.3,
9-106.1, 9-213.1, 9-316.1, 12-819, 13-203a, 13-214a, and 15-102.1 of the "Code
of Civil Procedure" approved August 19, 1981, as amended, are amended to
read as follows:
(ch. 110, par. 2-209.1)
Sec. 2-209.1. Actions by and against voluntary associations. A voluntary
unincorporated association may sue and be sued in its own name, and may
complain and defend in all actions. For the purposes of this Code, "voluntary
unincorporated association" means any organization of 2 or more individuals
formed for a common purpose, excluding a partnership or corporation.
191. Id. § 73 (1955).
192. Id. § 48 (1977).
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(ch. 110, par. 2-416).
Sec. 2-416. Representation of corporations in small claims. A corporation
may prosecute as plaintiff or defend as defendant any small claims proceeding
in any court of this State through any officer, director, manager, department
manager or supervisor of the corporation, as though such corporation were
appearing in its proper person.
No corporation may appear as assignee or subrogee in a small claims pro-
ceeding.
For the purposes of this Section, the term "officer" means the president,
vice-president, registered agent or other person vested with the responsibility
of managing the affairs of the corporation, and "small claims proceeding"
means a civil action based on either tort or contract for money not in excess
of $2,500, exclusive of interests and costs, or for collection of taxes not in
excess of that amount.
(ch. 110, par. 2-621)
Sec. 2-621. Product liability actions. (a) In any product liability action based
in whole or in part on the doctrine of strict liability in tort commenced or
maintained against a defendant or defendants other than the manufacturer,
that party shall upon answering or otherwise pleading file an affidavit certi-
fying the correct identity of the manufacturer of the product allegedly causing
injury, death or damage. The commencement of a product liability action based
in whole or in part on the doctrine of strict liability in tort against such
defendant or defendants shall toll the applicable statute of limitation and stat-
ute of repose relative to the defendant or defendant for purposes of asserting
a strict liability in tort cause of action.
(b) Once the plaintiff has filed a complaint against the manufacturer or
manufacturers and the manufacturer or manufacturers have or are required
to have answered or otherwise pleaded, the court shall order the dismissal of
a strict liability in tort claim against the certifying defendant or defendants,
provided the certifying defendant or defendants are not within the categories
set forth in subsection (c) of this Section. Due diligence shall be exercised by
the certifying defendant or defendants in providing the plaintiff with the cor-
rect identity of the manufacturer or manufacturers, and due diligence shall
be exercised by the plaintiff in filing an action and obtaining jurisdiction over
the manufacturer or manufacturers.
The plaintiff may at any time subsequent to the dismissal move to vacate
the order of dismissal and reinstate the certifying defendant or defendants,
provided plaintiff can show one or more of the following:
(1) That the applicable period of statute of limitation or statute of repose
bars the assertion of a strict liability in tort cause of action against the man-
ufacturer or manufacturers of the product allegedly causing the injury, death
or damage; or
(2) That the identity of the manufacturer given to the plaintiff by the cer-
tifying defendant or defendants was incorrect. Once the correct identity of
the manufacturer has been given by the certifying defendant or defendants;
the court shall again dismiss the certifying defendant or defendants; or
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(3) That the manufacturer no longer exists, cannot be subject to the juris-
diction of the courts of this State, or despite due diligence, the manufacturer
is not amenable amendable to service of process; or
(4) That the manufacturer is unable to satisfy any judgment as determined
by the court; or
(5) That the court determines that the manufacturer would be unable to
satisfy a reasonable settlement or other agreement with plaintiff.
(c) A court shall not enter a dismissal order relative to any certifying
defendant or defendants other than the manufacturer even though full com-
pliance with subsection (a) of this Section has been made where the plaintiff
can show one or more of the following:
(1) That the defendant has exercised some significant control over the de-
sign or manufacture of the product, or has provided instruction or warning
to the manufacturer relative to the alleged defect in the product which caused
the injury, death or damage; or
(2) That the defendant had actual knowledge of the defect in the product
which caused the injury, death or damage; or
(3) That the defendant created the defect in the product which caused the
injury, death or damage.
(d) Nothing contained in this Section shall be construed to grant a cause of
action in strict liability in tort or any other legal theory, or to affect the right
of any person to seek and obtain indemnity or contribution.
(e) This Section applies to all causes of action accruing on or after Septem-
ber 24, 1979.
(ch. 110, par. 2-1402)
Sec. 2-1402. Supplementary proceedings. (a) A judgment creditor, or his or
her successor in interest when that interest is made to appear of record, is
entitled to prosecute supplementary proceedings for the purposes of examin-
ing the judgment debtor or any other person to discover assets or income of
the debtor not exempt from the enforcement of the judgment therefrom, a
deduction order or garnishment, and of compelling the application of non-
exempt assets or income discovered toward the payment of the amount due
under the judgment. A supplementary proceeding shall be commenced by the
service of a citation issued by the clerk. The procedure for conducting sup-
plementary supplemental proceedings shall be prescribed by rules. It is not a
prerequisite to the commencement of a supplemental proceeding that a cer-
tified copy of the judgment has been returned wholly or partly unsatisfied.
(b) When assets or income of the judgment debtor not exempt from the
satisfaction of a judgment, a deduction order or garnishment are discovered,
the court may, by appropriate order or judgment:
(1) Compel the judgment debtor to deliver up, to be applied in satisfaction
of the judgment, in whole or in part, money, choses in action, property or
effects in his or her possession or control, so discovered, capable of delivery
and to which his or her title or right of possession is not substantially dis-
puted.
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(2) Compel the judgment debtor to pay to the judgment creditor or apply
on the judgment, in installments, a portion of his or her income, however or
whenever earned or acquired, as the court may deem proper, having due re-
gard for the reasonable requirements of the judgment debtor and his or her
family, if dependent upon him or her, as well as any payments required to be
made by prior order of court or under wage assignments outstanding. The
court may modify an order for installment payments, from time to time, upon
application of either party upon notice to the other.
(3) Compel any person cited, other than the judgment debtor, to deliver up
any assets so discovered, to be applied in satisfaction of the judgment, in whole
or in part, when those assets are held under such circumstances that in an
action by the judgment debtor he or she could recover them in specie or ob-
tain a judgment for the proceeds or value thereof as for conversion or em-
bezzlement.
(4) Enter any order upon or judgment against the person cited that could
be entered in any garnishment proceeding.
(5) Compel any person cited to execute an assignment of any chose in action
or a conveyance of title to real or personal property, in the same manner and
to the same extent as a court could do in any proceeding by a judgment cred-
itor to enforce payment of a judgment or in aid of the enforcement of a judg-
ment.
(6) Authorize the judgment creditor to maintain an action against any per-
son or corporation that, it appears upon proof satisfactory to the court, is
indebted to the judgment debtor, for the recovery of the debt, forbid the
transfer or other disposition of the debt until an action can be commenced
and prosecuted to judgment, direct that the papers or proof in the possession
or control of the debtor and necessary in the prosecution of the action be
delivered to the creditor or impounded in court, and provide for the dispo-
sition of any moneys in excess of the sum required to pay the judgment cred-
itor's judgment and costs allowed by the court.
(c) All property ordered to be delivered up shall, except as otherwise pro-
vided in this section, be delivered to the sheriff to be collected by the sheriff
or sold at public sale and the proceeds thereof applied towards the payment
of costs and the satisfaction of the judgment.
(d) (1) The citation may prohibit the party to whom it is directed from mak-
ing or allowing any transfer or other disposition of, or interfering with, any
property not exempt from the enforcement of a judgment therefrom, a de-
duction order or garnishment, belonging to the judgment debtor or to which
he or she may be entitled or which may thereafter be acquired by or become
due to him or her, and from paying over or otherwise disposing of any mon-
eys not so exempt which are due or to become due to the judgment debtor,
until the further order of the court of the termination of the proceeding,
whichever occurs first. The third party may not be obliged to withhold the
payment of any moneys beyond double the amount of the judgment sought
to be enforced by the judgment creditor. The court may punish any party who
violates the restraining provision of a citation as and for a contempt, or if the
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party is a third party may enter judgment against him or her in the amount
of the unpaid portion of the judgment, and costs allowable under this section,
or in the amount of the value of the property transferred, whichever is lesser.
(2) The court may enjoin any person, whether or not a party to the sup-
plementary proceeding, from making or allowing any transfer or other dis-
position of, or interference with, the property of the judgment debtor, or the
property or debt concerning which any person is required to attend and be
examined until further direction in the premises. The injunction order shall
remain in effect until vacated by the court or until the proceeding is termi-
nated, whichever first occurs.
(e) If it appears that any property, chose in action, credit or effect discov-
ered, or any interest therein, is claimed by any person other than the judgment
debtor, the court shall, as in garnishment proceedings, permit or require the
claimant to appear and maintain his or her right. The rights of the person
cited (other than the judgment debtor) and the rights of any adverse claimant
shall be asserted and determined pursuant to the law relating to garnishment
proceedings.
(f) Costs in proceedings authorized by this Section shall be allowed, as-
sessed and paid in accordance with rules.
(g) This Section is in addition to and does not affect enforcement of judg-
ments or proceedings supplementary thereto, by any other methods now or
hereafter provided by law.
(h) This Section does not grant the power to any court to order installment
or order payments from, or compel the sale, delivery, surrender, assignment
or conveyance of any property exempt by statute from the enforcement of a
judgment thereon, a deduction order, garnishment, attachment, sequestra-
tion, process or other levy or seizure.
(i) An order, judgment, citation or injunction under this Section that relates
to a security which is transferable as provided in Section 8-320 of the Uniform
Commercial Code may be entered only against the judgment debtor, against
a person who carries on his, her or its books an account in the name of the
judgment debtor in which an interest in that security is reflected or against
the person to whom the judgment debtor has pledged that security.
(ch. 110, par. 6-137)
Sec. 6-137. Issue of fact on petition. If any issue of fact is presented on
such petition, it shall be tried as in other civil cases; and if such issue is found
for the plaintiff, or if demand for trial by jury has been made in accordance
with law, a jury may assess damages in the amount of the mesne profits re-
ceived by the defendant since he or she entered into possession of the prem-
ises, subject to the restrictions contained in Article VI of this Act.
(ch. 110, par. 9-104.1)
Sec. 9-104.1. Demand-Notice-Return-Condominium and Contract
Purchasers. (a) In case there is a contract for the purchase of such lands or
tenements or in case of condominium property, the demand shall give the
purchaser under such contract, or to the condominium unit owner, as the case
may be, at least 30 days to satisfy the terms of the demand before an action
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is filed. In case of a condominium unit, the demand shall set forth the amounts
claimed which must be paid within the time prescribed in the demand and the
time period or periods when the amounts were originally due. The demand
shall be signed by the person claiming such possession, his or her agent, or
attorney.
(b) The demand set forth in subsection (a) of this Section shall be served
either personally upon such purchaser or condominium unit owner by sending
the demand thereof by registered or certified mail with return receipt re-
quested to the last known address of such purchaser or condominium unit
owner or in case no one is in the actual possession of the premises, then by
posting the same on the premises. When such demand is made by an officer
authorized to serve process, his or her return is prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated and if such demand is made by any person not an officer,
the return may be sworn to by the person serving the same, and is then prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. No other demand shall be required
as a prerequisite to filing an action under paragraph (7) of Section 9-102 of
this Act Cede.
(ch. 110, par. 9-104.3)
Sec. 9-104.3. Applicability of Article. All common interest community as-
sociations electing pursuant to paragraph (8) of subsection (a) Section 9-102
to have this Article made applicable to such association shall follow the same
procedures and have the same rights and responsibilities as condominium as-
sociations under this Article.
(ch. 110, par. 9-106.1)
Sec. 9-106.1. Action for condominium assessments not barred or waived by
acceptance of assessments for time periods not covered by demand. An action
brought under paragraph (7) of Section 9-102 of this Act Artiele is neither
barred nor waived by the action of a Board of Managers in accepting pay-
ments from a unit owner for his or her proportionate share of the common
expenses or of any other expenses lawfully agreed upon for any time period
other than that covered by the demand.
(ch. 110, par. 9-213.1)
Sec. 9-213.1. Duty of landlord to mitigate damages. After January 1, 1984
the .ffeti v, date of this amendatey A t of 1983, a landlord or his or her
agent shall take reasonable measures to mitigate the damages recoverable
against a defaulting lessee.
(ch. 110, par. 9-316.1)
Sec. 9-316.1. Tenant's duty to disclose to landlord identity of vendee of
crops. (a) (4) Where, pursuant to Section 9-316, a landlord has required that,
before the tenant sells crops grown on the demised premises, the tenant dis-
close to the landlord the persons to whom the tenant intends to sell such crops,
it is unlawful for the tenant to sell the crops to a person other than a person
so disclosed to the landlord.
(b) (2) An individual who knowingly violates this Section is shall-be guilty
of a Class A misdemeanor.
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(c) (3) A corporation convicted of a violation of this Section is shall-be
guilty of a business offense and shall be fined not less than $2000 nor more
than $10,000.
(d) (4) In the event the tenant is a corporation or a partnership, any officer,
director, manager or managerial agent of the tenant who violates this Section
or causes the tenant to violate this Section is shall-be guilty of a Class A mis-
demeanor.
(e) (-5) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for the violation of this
Section that the tenant has paid to the landlord the proceeds from the sale of
the crops within 10 days after such sale.
(ch. 110, par. 12-819)
Sec. 12-819. Limitations on part 8 of Article XII. The provisions of this
Part 8 of Article XII of this Act do not apply to orders for withholding of
income entered by the court under provisions of The Illinois Public Aid Code,
the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the Non-Support of
Spouse and Children Act, the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act and the Paternity Act for support of a child or maintenance of
a spouse.
(ch. 110, par. 13-203a)
Sec. 13-203.1 -3-203a. Loss of means of support or parental relationships.
Actions for damages for loss of means of support or loss of parental or in
loco parentis relationships sustained by a minor resulting from an injury de-
scribed in Section 13-214.1 13 214a may be commenced no later than 10 years
after the person who inflicted such injury has completed his sentence therefor.
(ch. 110, par. 13-214a)
Sec. 13-214.1 -3-214a. Action for damages involving criminal acts. Actions
for damages for an injury described in Section 13-202 or Section 13-203 aris-
ing out of murder or the commission of a Class X felony by the person against
whom the action is brought may be commenced no later than 10 years after
the person who inflicted such injury has completed his or her sentence there-
for.
(ch. 110, par. 15-102.1)
Sec. 15-102.1. Extent of Applicability. Mortgages securing "revolving credit"
loans as authorized by Section 5c of the "Illinois Banking Act", approved
May 11, 1955, as amended; by Section 1-6b of the "Illinois Savings and Loan
Act", approved July 5, 1955, as amended; or by Section 46 of the "Illinois
Credit Union Act", approved August 30, 1979, as amended; shall be subject
to this Act except where this Act is inconsistent with those Sections.
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon its becoming a law.
This Act became law by Pub. Act No. 84-1043, effective Nov. 26, 1985.
Y. Availability of Additional Source Material
In late 1981, the West Publishing Company published the Guide to Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure.93 In this Guide, the author highlighted numerous
193. See supra note 79.
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code sections that required amendment. Many of the sections that needed al-
teration have already been addressed and need no further attention. A num-
ber of sections, however, have only been corrected in part, and some sections
remain as they were at the time that the Guide was published. Other needed
corrections that were previously overlooked or were discovered subsequent to
the publication of the Guide have been carefully treated in the previous pages
of this article. 9 4
111. PROGRESS IN 1985 AND THE TASK AHEAD
In 1985, this author urged a member of the Illinois House of Representa-
tives to introduce in the House a number of bills contained in this law review
article. This approach resulted in favorable action in both the House and Sen-
ate, so that by the time this article was ready to go to press a number of bills
contained therein were passed and became law.
The citizens of Illinois are profoundly indebted to those devoted legislators
who gave prompt attention to the solution of these legislative problems, and
we sincerely hope for prompt attention by all legislators to the remainder of
the needed legislation urged in this article.
This article will assist all persons-legislators, lawyers, judges, and citi-
zens-who wish to participate in creating a Code of Civil Procedure for Illi-
nois which may be used as a model for other states to follow.
194. To conserve space in this article and avoid repetition, the following 13 listed items,
which are still in need of correction, are incorporated herein by reference to the Guide:
Section of Code Pages of Guide
1-104 48-49
2-611 85-88
2-1206(a) 121-122
2-1305 127-135
2-1402(d) 137-143
3-102 147-151
12-183(h) 370-373
12-201 373-376
12-202 376-377
12-8 13 403-405
12-910 410-411
19-125 516-517
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